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ABSTRACT 
The specific goal of this thesis is to provide a strategic guide which 
can be used as a basis by Naval Supply Center (NSC), Oakland, California 
to formulate a natural disaster planning, preparedness, response and 
recovery program. 
The objective of such a program is to reduce the amount of damage 
caused by a natural disaster, enable effective response to a disaster and 
facilitate recovery. The plan must be consistent with the supply center's 
priorities and be within budget limitations. Further, the plan must address 
additional areas such as supporting other defense activities and responding 
to taskings from the Federal Emergencey Management Agency (FEMA). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  PURPOSE 
This thesis is a strategic guide. It is designed to be 
used as a foundation upon which a natural disaster plan for 
the Naval Supply Center (NSC), Oakland, California can be 
constructed. 
Natural disasters which have recently struck various 
military communities have raised the level of awareness 
concerning the potential threat which these phenomena pose to 
military readiness. Hurricane Hugo, which buffeted the 
southeastern seaboard of the United States in September, 1989, 
and the Loma Prieta earthquake, which struck the San Francisco 
bay area on October 17, 1989, both illustrate the extensive 
amount of destruction which can follow such natural disasters. 
A review of the geographical locations of military 
installations reveals that none are immune to the threat of a 
natural disaster. 
The Loma Prieta earthquake resulted in 62 known deaths and 
3,757 reported injuries. The earthquake incurred more than $8 
billion dollars in property damage in both the public and 
private sectors. Damage to Northern California Naval shore 
installations is estimated at $175 million dollars 
[Ref. 1].   The Navy will  spend more than $240 million 
for the Hugo recovery effort in Charleston, South Carolina 
[Ref. 2]. The cost to local communities in terms of 
future productivity is more difficult to quantify, but 
represents a major consideration. 
Local communities which have experienced such disasters 
have learned to regard the armed forces that reside in their 
regions as essential community resources. As such, various 
military activities are increasingly relied upon to assist the 
private sector during emergency response as well as recovery 
efforts. For example, during the Loma Prieta earthquake over 
11,000 Department of the Navy (DON), military, and civilian 
personnel were used to assist civilian authorities in their 
response and recovery efforts [Ref. l:p. 2]. This increasing 
dependence upon the military implies a role that moves beyond 
parochial concerns and embraces the concept of community 
awareness and mutual aid. Although this is hardly a new 
function for the military, the issue must be deliberately 
addressed by disaster planning documents. 
Post-disaster reports detailing the lessons learned from 
natural disasters by military activities as well as reports by 
affected metropolitan communities, echo the need for immediate 
and greater emphasis upon planning and preparation. 
Commander, Naval Base San Francisco compiled lessons learned 
from all Naval activities within his jurisdiction as regional 
planning  agent  (RPA)  for  Northern  California  [Ref. 3]. 
The document, 17 Oct 89 Loma Prieta Earthquake After Action 
Report, states: 
. . . Regional and local disaster preparedness plans were 
too general and not supportive of earthquake-generated 
issues. 
and, 
. . Due to the fact that there is a high probability of 
additional major earthquakes occurring, there is a clear 
need for improved pre-planning, training and preparation 
by SFBA [San Francisco Bay Area] naval shore activities. 
The Loma Prieta earthquake was an excellent dress 
rehearsal.  [Ref. l:pp.S-IV-l, S-IV-2] 
In order to focus planning efforts, a fundamental strategy 
must first be developed. This is especially important given 
the diverse array of possible primary and secondary effects 
which a natural disaster can have on a community. All 
management alternatives must be identified and explored. A 
strategy must be established which provides a distinct 
direction and clears the path leading to a rational planning 
approach. 
The specific goal of this thesis is to provide a strategic 
guide which can be used as a basis by NSC Oakland, California 
to prepare a natural disaster preparedness, response and 
recovery plan. Presently, NSC Oakland maintains a plan that 
was used during the recent Loma Prieta earthquake. The 
experience revealed limitations in both adequacy and scope of 
the plan. The supply center has begun an effort to update and 
improve its plan so that it is comprehensive, workable and 
remains within budget constraints. 
The objective of NSC Oakland's plan is to reduce the 
hazards imposed by a natural disaster, enable effective 
response to a disaster, and facilitate short term recovery. 
The plan must be consistent with the supply center's own 
perceived mission priorities. Further, the plan must address 
additional aspects such as the functional support of other 
defense activities, and response to tasking from the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 
B.  DISCUSSION AND BACKGROUND 
1. Discussion 
Secretary of the Navy Instruction 3050.32A requires 
defense activities to have disaster preparedness and response 
plans.  The instruction states, 
DoD Components will, as appropriate, develop contingency 
plans for major disaster operations. Military commanders 
shall be responsible for assuring that such contingency 
plans are coordinated with FDAA [Federal Disaster 
Assistance Administration] Regions and appropriate civil 
authorities at State and local levels.  [Ref. 4] 
An  examination  of  plans  from  various  commands 
indicates that while most meet administrative requirements, 
they are inadequate in preparing for and decreasing the 
effects of a major disaster.  Recent natural disasters which 
involved NSC Charleston, South Carolina and NSC Oakland, 
California highlight the susceptibility of naval activities to 
the forces of nature. This underlines the need for a strategy 
to provide the basis for structuring a comprehensive plan. 
Little can be done to prevent natural disasters from 
occurring. However, technology provides the means for 
statistically predicting the character and extent of many 
natural disasters that may occur in a given geographical area 
during a particular period. For example, the Loma Prieta 
earthquake is an example of a natural phenomenon which was 
forecasted by seismologists well in advance of the actual 
event.* 
Based upon these statistical predictions, risks can be 
assessed and plans formulated to deal with the disaster. 
Actions taken to reduce the level of destruction and loss 
through the development and implementation of a thorough plan 
can result in a more efficient, less costly response and 
recovery effort. 
Plan development must be consistent with command 
goals, priorities and resources as well as conducive to actual 
implementation. The success of the effort, from planning 
through implementation, depends heavily on the firm direction, 
support, and commitment of executive management, both internal 
and external to the command. 
^The specific date, itself, was not predicted, but rather the 
approximate intensity and time window of occurrence were predicted. 
2. Background 
a. Naval Supply Center, Oakland, California 
The Naval Supply Center, Oakland is a complex of 
administrative and warehouse structures. Located on the San 
Francisco Bay, amid an industrial complex and seaport, the 
center's location and physical attributes render it 
particularly vulnerable to the effects of an earthquake. Two 
principal faults, the San Andreas and the Hayward fault, lie 
to the west and east, respectively, of the complex. Much of 
the center's infrastructure is built upon landfill which 
renders the area particularly vulnerable to the effects of 
1iquefaction. 
b. Loma Prieta Earthquake: October 17, 1989 
The awareness of the management of NSC Oakland 
about the damage potential of natural disasters was 
substantially increased by the Loma Prieta earthquake of 
October 17, 1989. This quake occurred in the remote Santa 
Cruz mountains about 50 miles southwest of San Francisco. 
Although the Bay Area suffered some severe damage, this damage 
was relatively minor compared to the destruction expected in 
an earthquake of similar magnitude occurring closer to the Bay 
Area. 
C.  BARRIERS TO PLANNING 
Planning is the conventional function of management.  It 
represents a proactive attempt by management to control and 
improve the outcome of a future circumstance. Planning is the 
only tool that affords management the opportunity to make 
strategic choices in advance of natural disasters. After 
action reports by communities affected by natural disasters 
indicate that a feasible plan can substantially reduce the 
costs and trauma incurred by such events. The alternative to 
good advance planning is to simply react when a disaster 
strikes. 
Regarding natural disasters, the planning component is at 
least a controllable aspect of an overall process containing 
many variables that can not be controlled. 
There is little question that prior planning is an 
essential component that improves the probability of survival 
of a community which has been struck by a disaster. However, 
an examination of various disaster planning documents which 
are currently in use reveals a propensity to meet an 
administrative requirement rather than to provide a 
comprehensive, well prepared plan which can actually be 
implemented. Factors which contribute to planning 
deficiencies must be acknowledged and overcome in order to 
establish a productive planning environment. 
The notion that natural disasters occur infrequently and 
at irregular intervals appears to erode a sense of urgency 
concerning disaster planning. Given a long term viewpoint, 
the probability that a natural disaster will strike is 
relatively high.  Unfortunately, short term natural disaster 
predictions are fraught with uncertainty. Physical 
manifestations which signal the onset of a natural disaster 
may be difficult to perceive and interpret correctly. 
Additionally, warning signs for some natural disasters may 
occur so close in time to the actual event that, in all 
practicality, there is insufficient time to prepare an 
adequate response. 
Planning, itself, is tedious and time consuming. Even a 
sense of accomplishment is elusive. Because natural disasters 
occur infrequently, individuals that plan for them may never 
see the outcome of their labor. The act of planning is often 
treated by the local military activity as a collateral 
function of individuals who have primary, day to day 
responsibility for other, more immediate organizational 
functions. 
Military installations are likely to select 
representatives from within their organizations to participate 
in disaster planning for the command. The selected planning 
representatives may be experts in isolated functional areas, 
such as training, personnel administration, or even fire 
fighting and medicine. Few of them are likely to have the 
breadth of knowledge or experience required to envision the 
entire scope of a planning enterprise with such diverse 
implications. The brevity of management tenure which is 
inherent in many military organizations also is an impediment 
to continuity and ultimate task completion. 
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These limiting factors suggest that for disaster planning 
to be fruitful, it must be an acknowledged and obvious 
management priority. Management commitment must be evident 
and continuing. 
It is worthwhile to note that plans which appeared to be 
the most comprehensive in terms of strategic rationale and 
overall applicability, were those from local metropolitan 
agencies, such as The City of Oakland Emergency Plan 
[Ref. 5]. Additionally, there appears to be a 
positive, evolutionary trend of improvement in these plans. 
In observed cases, the plans were the result of a 
committed and focused effort by civic leaders. One 
explanation for this may be that disaster planning by civil 
authorities is considered by them to be one of their prime 
responsibilities to their constituents. Specific line item 
funding is provided to correct known planning deficiencies. 
For example, before the Loma Prieta earthquake, the 
Association of Bay Area Governments had allocated $42,975 to 
analyze alternative strategies for reducing the number and 
severity of hazardous materials incidents during earthquakes 
[Ref. 6]. This indicates a willingness to dedicate financial 
resources and use private sector specialists. This is not 
always characteristic of military planning. 
D.  ASSUMPTIONS 
1. General Assumptions 
The thesis assumes that the adverse effects of a 
natural disaster can be substantially lessened through a 
series of planning and management implementation actions 
accomplished prior to the disaster. An important objective 
of the planning strategy is the identification of major 
alternatives among which managers can choose before a disaster 
strikes. Two critical components which must be addressed in 
detail are readiness planning and a process of informed 
decision making. 
The probability that a natural disaster will, at some 
point, strike a community implies a range of unsettling 
assumptions concerning the nature and extent of the 
devastation. The basis of concern rests with the well founded 
apprehension that a natural disaster is capable of causing a 
violent change in an organization's day-to-day operating 
environment and in the creation of its outputs and procurement 
of its resources. 
According to the U.S. Department of the Interior, the 
natural disaster which poses the greatest threat to NSC 
Oakland is that of an earthquake. The Department of the 
Interior predicts that there is a 20 percent probability of an 
earthquake of magnitude seven or larger occurring in the next 
30 years at either the Southern East Bay, the San Francisco 
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Peninsula, or the Northern East Bay. The California Division 
of Mines and Geology and the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency have forecasted that the following effects will be 
caused by an earthquake of this magnitude: 
• Deaths:  1,500-4,500; 
• Injuries:  45,000-135,000; 
• Damage:  Exceeding $40 billion; 
• One or more hospitals will be destroyed; 
• All four bridges to the East Bay will probably be closed 
for hours to days; 
• Access to and travel within the East Bay will be difficult 
and limited to emergency traffic; 
• Only the San Jose International Airport may be available 
for large aircraft.  [Ref. 7] 
2. Assuming a Worst Case Scenario 
For the purposes of this thesis, a worst case scenario 
is assumed and plan development will proceed using this 
assumption as a baseline. Accordingly, an earthquake of 
magnitude 7 or greater along any one of the three bay area 
faults is expected to produce the following "worst case" 
scenario: 
• A large number of deaths and injuries, destruction of a 
large percentage of facilities that serve human needs, an 
overwhelming demand on state and local response resources 
and systems, severe long term effects on both the general 
economic activity and on state, local and private sector 
efforts to carry out initial recovery activities. 
• The earthquake will occur without warning at a time of day 
that produces the maximum number of casualties. Access to 
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and from the damaged areas may be severely restricted for 
hours and perhaps days. Communications and life support 
systems will be severely disrupted or destroyed. Day and 
night scenarios must be examined. 
• Earthquakes and resulting aftershocks may trigger 
secondary events such as fires, tsunamis, liquefaction, 
landslides, flooding, release of hazardous materials, and 
dam failures. 
• Immediately after a catastrophic earthquake, the Governor 
will declare a state of emergency, followed later by a 
Presidential disaster declaration. State and Federal life 
support and emergency response operations can then begin. 
However, resources may not be available in sufficient 
quantities for several days. 
• Although local resources will probably be inadequate to 
respond to the effects of such a major earthquake, local 
jurisdictions will have to be self-sufficient for the 
first few hours and perhaps several days after the 
earthquake. Local governments must maintain updated 
resource inventories, and determine priorities and 
procedures for the use of these resources. 
[Ref. 8] 
3. Planning Assumptions for Naval Supply Center 
Considering a worst case scenario, the planning 
assumptions for the Oakland Naval Supply Center are as 
follows: 
• A large percentage of buildings and facilities are either 
severely damaged or destroyed. Personnel casualties will 
include both deaths and injuries. 
• The earthquake occurs without warning during normal 
working hours. However, planning must include after hours 
recall of employees. 
• Communications and utilities are severely disrupted or 
destroyed.  Computer systems are disabled. 
• Secondary effects such as fire, flooding, and release of 
hazardous materials will occur. 
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• Area resources are severely constrained. The Naval Supply 
Center must be able to sustain itself for a minimum of 24 
hours. Certain types of outside assistance may take 
substantially longer to arrive. 
• The Naval Supply Center will be tasked to provide supplies 
to area government activities by the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency. 
E.  SCOPE 
This thesis is intended to provide a strategy and a 
framework to facilitate the formulation of a comprehensive 
plan which can lessen the effects that a natural disaster has 
on a community. To illustrate this process in a specific way, 
the primary focus of the planning process is Naval Supply 
Center (NSC), Oakland, California. 
Given the diversity of possible primary and secondary 
effects which a disaster can cause, a strategy which attempts 
to yield a workable plan must be as dynamic as it is 
implementable. This implies a scope whose range is 
sufficiently broad to require a mechanism for plan adjustment 
throughout the planning, execution and recovery process. 
The scope of this thesis addresses only the implications 
related to natural disasters. The term "natural disaster" is 
defined to include any crisis in a community that is incurred 
through circumstances inflicted by nature. Examples of 
natural disasters are: earthquakes, hurricanes, fires, 
floods, extremely high tides, volcanic eruptions, landslides, 
and droughts.  Since NSC Oakland, California is the community 
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used to illustrate the strategic planning process in this 
thesis, the thrust of concern centers upon the projected 
effects of a major earthquake upon the supply center. 
Conversely, an un-natural or "man-made" disaster is one in 
which the crisis is caused by direct or indirect human 
intervention. Examples of man-made disasters are: terrorist 
actions, pollution, arson, aircraft crashes, ruptures in gas, 
oil, or water pipelines, nuclear, biological or chemical 
attacks or accidental releases, and civil unrest. 
A major natural disaster is an event that can affect 
millions of people, not only in the immediate area, but 
throughout the nation. Depending upon the time and the place 
of occurrence, a major natural disaster can cause thousands of 
personnel casualties. Billions of dollars of property may be 
damaged or lost. Loss of productivity can be widespread, long 
lasting, and in many instances permanent. 
There are distinct similarities in the effects of 
disasters, both natural and man-made, upon a community. 
Although the scope of the thesis is limited to natural 
disasters and is further narrowed to NSC Oakland, many of the 
assumed conditions may be applied to natural disasters other 
than earthquakes, as well as to man-made disasters. 
Additionally, the planning strategy in this thesis is 
sufficiently general to enable many of its elements to be used 
as an aide in the development of plans for natural or man-made 
disasters in other military and civilian communities. 
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P.  PHASES INVOLVED IN THE DISASTER PLANNING PROCESS 
There are four main phases to the disaster planning and 
management process. These phases are listed below in their 
general order of occurrence: 
1. Planning Phase 
2. Preparation Phase 
3. Execution Phase 
4. Recovery Phase 
Each phase consists of several functions. These functions 
are sub-phases or stages of the phase. Stages in the planning 
phase are the functions of: pre-planning and plan 
development. In the Execution Phase, the functions are the 
transition to emergency action stage and the full response 
stage. Work can proceed simultaneously in several phases, 
especially in the Planning and Preparation Phases. 
The Planning Phase includes a pre-planning set-up interval 
as well as the construction of a strategic planning design 
which is unique to the command. Pre-planning erects the basic 
organizational structure to support the subsequent plan 
development. Management commitment is established, 
individuals are grouped to form an executive steering 
committee and basic assumptions concerning the direction and 
objectives to be achieved are discussed and promoted. 
Under actual plan development (the second stage of the 
Planning Phase), mission priorities are affirmed, the threat 
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is defined, limitations are identified, and risk is assessed. 
Resources are examined for potential applicability to the 
threat. The outcome of the Planning Phase should include 
management actions and information which provide a logical 
rationale and a clear process for confronting the potential 
disaster. Concepts developed in this stage will be formalized 
in a natural disaster plan which is written in the Preparation 
Phase. 
The Preparation Phase implements the decisions made during 
the Planning Phase that relate directly to the community's 
readiness posture. It is here that management concerns are 
reflected in a fully documented plan. Consistent with the 
plan, material is procured and pre-positioned, responsibility 
for planned actions is delegated, contracts are negotiated and 
training schedules are followed. The plan is exercised and 
tested for viability through drills. Adjustments to the plan 
are made, depending upon the outcome of periodic testing, and 
the information obtained from doing the Preparation Phase. 
The Execution Phase may begin when it is learned that a 
disaster is imminent, or has happened. Execution comprises 
two stages: the transition to emergency action, and full 
emergency response. The period of transition from routine 
operations to emergency action is a critical step in 
sustaining a stricken community until a fully orchestrated 
effort and adequate resources can be brought to bear on the 
disaster.  The interval in which emergency action occurs is 
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likely to tax the most comprehensive of planning efforts. 
Emergency action will take place in a dynamic environment in 
which numerous complex problems must be addressed immediately 
and severely constrained resources must be carefully 
allocated. 
The Recovery Phase focuses primarily upon actions which 
are aimed at returning the community to normal operations. 
Also during recovery, accumulated data is analyzed and used to 
improve the disaster plan and preparation. 
Table I, below, summarizes each phase and applicable 
stages: 
TABLE I 
PHASES AND STAGES OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT 
1. PLANNING PHASE 
- Pre-Planning Stage 
- Plan Development Stage 
2. PREPARATION PHASE 
3. EXECUTION PHASE 
- Transition To Emergency Action 
Stage 
- Emergency Response Stage 
4. RECOVERY PHASE 
Each phase and its components will be described in a 
generic sense, and their specific applicability to NSC 
Oakland, California will be discussed.  Where it is possible 
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to do so, suggestions specific to the supply center will be 
provided for consideration by the command for their use in the 
planning process. 
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II.  PLANNING PHASE:  PRE-PLANNING 
A. PRE-PLANNING OVERVIEW 
Pre-planning is the first stage in the overall planning 
phase. It defines the problem, sets the tone, and provides a 
direction. It prepares an organization to undertake planning 
as a coordinated effort. Organizational goals are promoted, 
executive management prerogatives are revealed and a firm 
management commitment to the disaster planning process is 
established.  The basic pre-planning steps are as follows: 
• Define the planning problem 
• Establish  and  promote management  commitment  to  the 
planning process 
• Establish the planning objectives 
• Define the present situation and assumptions 
• Define planning responsibilities 
• Initiate the command's planning process 
B. DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
1. Overview 
The initial problem should be described in simple and 
fundamental terms. At this stage, a problem statement which 
is too specific may unintentionally narrow the scope of 
subsequent planning efforts. There are many instances where 
the actual problem may not be known or clearly understood, 
19 
however, the symptoms of a perceived problem are evident when 
manifested. For example, the damage that occurred in the 
NISTARS warehouse at NSC Oakland, is symptomatic of various 
structural and non-structural problems. Exploration of these 
symptoms can disclose the fundamental problem and lead to 
alternative solutions. It is sufficient, then, to describe 
the symptoms. The symptoms can later be studied by an 
executive steering committee who, as one of its first tasks, 
will attempt to express the problem in more succinct terms. 
2. NSC Oakland's Specific Problem 
NSC Oakland perceives limitations to its existing 
disaster, response and recovery plan. These shortfalls were 
discovered during the October 17, 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake 
and were carefully documented as "lessons learned." The 
supply center found that its plan was too general in scope and 
too awkward in format to permit rapid and effective 
implementation. Those aspects of the plan which were executed 
proved inadequate in providing necessary, timely data to 
decision makers. As a result, the center's mission was 
impaired and recovery efforts were hampered. [Ref. 9] 
The supply center is pursuing development of a plan which 
overcomes these limitations. 
C.  ESTABLISH AND PROMOTE MANAGEMENT COMMITMENT 
It  is  incumbent  upon  an  organization's  executive 
management to foster and maintain the necessary sense of 
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urgency, ownership, and commitment throughout the entire 
disaster planning process. A perception of strong commitment 
from management is crucial in creating the momentum to carry 
the task through to successful completion. Commitment entails 
more than a policy statement concerning the importance of the 
task at hand. The level of active involvement by executive 
management personnel throughout the planning and preparation 
process demonstrates the importance which they place on it. 
In the pre-planning stage it is essential that executive 
management recognizes its fundamental role. Appearances by 
executive management personnel at critical meetings, the type 
and status of individuals who are selected for key positions, 
the level of financial resources which are provided, public 
and private statements and actions are all critically 
interpreted by subordinates to determine the level of 
importance placed on the task by executive management. 
Executive management, both internal and external to the 
command, must be fully supportive of planning efforts if the 
process is to succeed. Planning for a major disaster is a 
complex and multi-dimensional task requiring close cooperation 
across departmental lines within the organization. A 
successful outcome demands a coordinated effort which can only 
come with firm support and direction from the top. 
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1. Suggested Actions to Establish and Promote Command 
Commitment 
1. Commence a program to educate employees about the 
probability of a natural disaster and its possible 
effects. 
2. Explain command intentions to prepare a natural disaster 
plan, the direction and methodology to be used, and the 
importance of the plan. 
3. Emphasize command commitment through the dedication of 
financial resources and personnel necessary to accomplish 
the task. 
2. Suggest Assignments to Establish and Promote Command 
Commitment 
1. Safety Officer: Using available media such as the plan 
of the day and base newspaper, begin an on-going natural 
disaster awareness program. Such a program must be well 
prepared and well presented. The program should go and 
stay beyond the basics. Information presented should be 
new, interesting and varied. 
2. Planning Department: Prepare a letter to all employees 
for the commanding officer's signature. The letter 
should announce the command's involvement and emphasize 
its commitment toward natural disaster planning and 
preparedness. 
D.  ESTABLISH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE PLAN 
The objectives to be incorporated into a comprehensive 
disaster plan are to: 
• Define the overall risk; 
• Describe actions to minimize structural and non-structural 
damage to facilities; 
• Describe actions to minimize the loss of life; 
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• Describe actions to lessen the disaster's impact  on 
mission accomplishment and minimize dollar losses; 
• Define what is preparedness, response , and recovery; 
• Ensure compatibility with guidelines furnished by higher 
authority; 
• Define responsibilities that are easily understood and can 
be accomplished by the command; and 
• Develop a planning document that can be implemented within 
budget constraints and within a reasonable period of time. 
E. PRESENT SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The assumptions stated in Chapter I, Section D,2, 
involving an earthquake of magnitude 7 or greater, centering 
in one of the three primary Bay Area faults, is used as a 
baseline in formulating a generalized "worst case" disaster 
scenario. The associated preparedness, response, and recovery 
plans will be written to address the implications which 
correspond to this  "worst case." 
F. DEFINE PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES 
Prior to plan development, the command must define the 
external and internal command structures specifically related 
to natural disaster planning and response. These principal 
parties set policies and procedures as well as participate 
directly in the disaster management process. 
1. External Command Structure 
The Naval Supply Center, Oakland has two external 
command relationships.   Concerning its assigned mission of 
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physical distribution, the Naval Supply Center is directly 
responsible to the Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command 
(NAVSUP). NSC Oakland's disaster preparedness plan reflects 
the following chain of command during periods of emergency: 
• President 
• Secretary of Defense 
• Secretary of the Navy 
• Chief of Naval Operations 
• Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet 
• Commander, Naval Base San Francisco, Ca. 
• Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station, Alameda, Ca. 
• Commander,   Naval   Supply   Center   Oakland,   Ca. 
[Ref. 10] 
General responsibilities within this latter command 
structure are as follows: 
The Secretary of Defense is responsible for the 
overall readiness of military forces and activities, and 
setting policies for disaster preparedness. 
The Secretary of the Navy is responsible to the 
Secretary of Defense for the readiness of military forces and 
activities under his jurisdiction, and for assignment of 
activities to execute the Department of Defense Disaster 
Preparedness Program. 
The Chief of Naval Operations is the executor for the 
Department of Defense Disaster Preparedness Program. 
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The Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet 
(CINCPACFLT) is designated by the Chief of Naval Operations as 
the Navy's Principal Planning Agent (PPA) for disaster 
preparedness. CINCPACFLT's areas of responsibility include 
Hawaii, Alaska, California, Oregon, Washington, Arizona, 
Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Idaho, Montana, Kansas, Guam, 
American Samoa and Trust Territories of the Pacific. When 
mobilized for civil defense, areas of responsibility will 
expand to include Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Arkansas, 
Missouri, Iowa, and Minnesota. 
The Commander, Naval Base (COMNAVBASE) San Francisco, 
Ca., is designated as one of the Navy's Regional Planning 
Agents (RPA) by CINCPACFLT. The COMNAVBASE, San Francisco 
area of responsibility comprises the northern half of the 
state of California, including SanMateo, Santa Clara, Merced, 
Mariposa, and Mono Counties, and all counties south of the 
Oregon border [Ref . 11]. Planning responsibilities 
within COMNAVBASE's authority include: 
• Develop and manage a disaster preparedness program and 
coordinate disaster preparedness planning for all naval 
shore activities, within assigned area of responsibility; 
• Coordinate with area Army, Air Force, and Coast Guard 
commands, Headquarters Sixth Continental U. S. Army, the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency Regional office, and 
state and local officials for disaster preparedness and 
planning; and 
• Designate Sub-Area Regional Planning Agents. 
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The Commanding Officer, Naval Air Station, Alameda, 
Ca. , is designated as the Sub-Area Regional Planning Agent 
(SRPA) by COMNAVBASE, San Francisco. His responsibilities 
include: 
• Develop and manage a disaster preparedness program in 
assigned area of responsibility; 
• Assign activities within their local area, as appropriate, 
to develop individual activity plans. 
Commander, Naval Supply Center, Oakland is tasked with 
disaster preparedness planning for the Naval Supply Center and 
tenant activities. 
2.  Internal Command Structure 
Table II illustrates the internal organization of the 
Naval Supply Center, Oakland.  [Ref. 12]  This 
organizational   chart   provides   information   on   those 




ORGANIZATION:  NSC OAKLAND 
Commanding Officer 
Public Affairs Executive Officer  Disaster 
Officer        (Special Assistants)   Preparedness 
Officer 
Functional Departments 
Civilian Personnel Department Code 20 
Planning and Management Services Department Code 40 
Comptrol ler Department Code 50 
Data Processing Department Code 60 
Installation Services Department Code 70 
Inventory Control Department Code 100 
Regional Contracting Department Code 200 
Physical Distribution Department Code 400 
Personal Property Department Code 500 
Aviation Department Code 600 
Fuel Department Code 700 
Regional Financial Services Department Code 800 
Special Material Supply Department Code 900 
The Commander, Naval Supply Center, Oakland, or a 
designated officer in the commander's absence, has overall 
responsibility for natural disaster preparedness planning and 
response for the Naval Supply Center and tenant activities. 
His responsibilities include: 
• Develop and manage a Disaster Preparedness Plan for the 
Naval Supply Center; 
• Appoint Officers/supervisory personnel to serve in 
disaster planning, preparedness, response and recovery 
positions; and 
• Plan for the employment of logistic support of disaster 
forces both internal and external to the command. 
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G.  INITIATING THE COMMAND'S PLANNING PROCESS 
Prior to actual plan development, the command must focus 
its efforts setting a direction and a methodology to approach 
the planning problem.  Five steps are required: 
1. Identify the existing support elements and activities 
2. Appoint a Disaster Plan Steering Committee 
3. Determine functional categories to be included in the 
plan 
4. Define Functional Sub-committee responsibilities 
5. Document Procedures 
1. Identify Existing Support Elements and Activities 
This step identifies programs and organizations both 
internal and external to the command that are beneficial to 
the planning effort. A wealth of knowledge and expertise 
exists which can be used to provide rich source material, 
conduct training, or to perform actual analysis, reducing the 
complexity and need for independent planning and 
implementation solely within the Planning Department. 
Within the command are certain offices whose ordinary 
functional responsibilities and missions incorporate elements 
that would prove helpful to disaster planning. The safety 
office, the fire department, the public affairs office, base 
security, the civilian personnel office and other offices can 
be prime contributors and facilitators to plan development. 
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Disregarding these resources would seriously hamper and 
restrict the planning effort. 
There are a number of local, state and federal 
agencies external to the command which can support disaster 
planning efforts. A few of these organizations are the local 
branch of the Federal Emergency Management Office, the 
American Red Cross, the Earthquake Education Project, and 
Association of Bay Area Governments (San Francisco Bay Area). 
a. Suggested Actions to Identify Existing Support 
Elements and Activities 
1. Consolidate, organize and review natural disaster 
information available within the command to assist in 
plan development and identify potential resources. 
2. Contact external sources to identify functional experts. 
Develop a list of points of contact and telephone 
numbers. 
3. Commence the order, collection and organization of a 
reference library of material on disaster management. 
b. Suggested Assignments to Identify Existing Support 
Elements and Activities 
1. Planning Department: Determine available resources and 
programs internal and external to the command and provide 
information to the command disaster preparedness officer. 
2. Disaster Preparedness Officer: establish and organize the 
natural disaster reference library. 
2. Appoint a Steering Committee 
This committee should consist of key members of the 
command's organization and will  provide the impetus  for 
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command direction and policy.  The steering committee will 
also: 
• Determine sub-committee membership 
• Set timetables for sub-committee performance 
• Review progress of sub-committees 
• Resolve conflicts 
• Ensure planning continuity 
• Review and approve sub-committee recommendations 
• Approve the final plan 
a. Suggested Actions to Appoint a Steering Committee 
1. Determine the composition and appoint members to a 
steering committee. The size of the steering committee 
is a command prerogative. However to simplify management 
control, it is recommended that the committee be limited 
to one chairman and no more than six top level management 
personnel. 
2. Conduct an initial meeting of the steering committee to 
orient members concerning the purpose of the committee. 
Task members to determine the composition of sub- 
committees . 
b. Suggested  Assignments  to  Appoint  a  Steering 
Committee 
1. Executive Officer: determine steering committee 
membership. For NSC Oakland it is recommended that the 
Planning Officer or the Executive Officer chair the 
Steering Committee. Members of the Steering Committee 
could include the Director of the Comptroller Department, 
the Director of the Data Processing Department, the 
Director of the Inventory Control Department, the 
Director of the Regional Contracting Department, the 
Director of the Physical Distribution Department and the 
Disaster Preparedness Officer. 
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3. Establish Criteria for Sub-committee Membership 
The size and composition of each sub-committee will be 
based upon the steering committee's determination of the 
extent and nature of the requirements to meet the proposed 
objectives of the overall plan. It is recommended that the 
number of sub-committees which report directly to the steering 
committee be limited. As the number of sub-committees 
increases, the level of human resources which they consume 
will also increase. Initially, it is only necessary to assign 
sub-committees to broad areas. If further decentralization is 
required, it can be accomplished by the sub-committees 
themselves. 
For these reasons, it is recommended that only one 
sub-committee be assigned to each phase of the natural 
disaster; i.e; one sub-committee will address issues relating 
to the Planning Phase, a different sub-committee will be 
concerned with the Preparation Phase, a third sub-committee 
will be responsible for the Execution Phase, and the fourth 
sub-committee will confront the problems posed by the Recovery 
Phase. 
Each sub-committee should be chaired by an individual 
who has considerable knowledge regarding the categories which 
comprise the phase to which he is assigned responsibility. It 
is important that his rank or status permit him adequate 
authority to direct sub-committee members as well as to 
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communicate on equal footing with other committee chairmen. 
The matter of rank is a significant point. Membership 
to these committees is likely to be a collateral assignment. 
A sub-committee chairman may be in a position of directing 
individuals who have other, primary duties. It is likely that 
some of his members may not be within his usual sphere of 
influence. He must be sensitive to these considerations, but 
have enough rank to enlist the cooperation of the members in 
meeting the committee's goals. Therefore, it is recommended 
that the chairmen of various sub-committees be at least a GS- 
12 or the associated military equivalent. 
As previously mentioned, an appointment as chairmen to 
sub-committee is expected to be a collateral duty assignment. 
There are two recommended exceptions. One individual from the 
Planning Department should serve in a primary capacity as an 
administrative advisor at sub-committee meetings and 
coordinator for sub-committee inputs. The Disaster 
Preparedness Coordinator should serve as a technical advisor 
to the various sub-committee chairmen. 
Membership in the sub-committees should be restricted 
to those with ability in the subject area as well as general 
availability to the enterprise. It may be necessary and 
desirable to modify sub-committee membership during the course 
of plan development. Sub-committee members should be aware of 
this.  Members may also be assigned to more than one 
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sub-committee.  An overlap of membership may even assist in 
insuring better coordination between sub-committees. 
4. Forming Categories and Assignments Within the Sub- 
committee 
In order to delineate assignments and responsibilities 
within a sub-committee, it is helpful to employ a process 
which identifies and isolates separate categories which 
reflect a purpose. This step is among the most critical to 
plan initiation. A "category" in this context refers to a 
number of tasks which are related and grouped according to 
their ability to meet a unique need. The need may be to do 
research and provide information, or it may include the 
additional step of actually providing a proposal which solves 
a problem. This rationale implies two basic methods which can 
be used to group tasks to form a functional category. 
a. The Homogeneous, Functional Category 
A useful convention is to group together tasks that 
fall within the normal responsibility of an existing 
organizational component. For example, all tasks which can be 
accomplished by the office of the staff civil engineer would 
be grouped together. Assessing the structural soundness of 
buildings, measuring the susceptibility of these structures to 
a projected threat, proposing designs to upgrade the buildings 
and estimating costs of the upgrade might all be considered 
tasks which comprise a relatively homogeneous functional 
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category.    The  category,  itself,  might  be  labeled  as 
"vulnerability of existing structures." 
This convention is convenient as well as practical. 
It permits an organizational component to focus almost 
entirely upon specific planning areas which it knows best. 
The resources and chain of command do not have to be altered 
significantly to accomplish the objectives. Therefore, 
information can be obtained quickly. 
Unfortunately, in many instances, forcing tasks to 
fit a relatively homogeneous functional category may 
inadvertently constrain the type of vital data that can be 
obtained and delay or hamper the final decision making 
process. The information provided by the Staff Civil Engineer 
still has to be compared to information from other sources to 
answer pertinent questions such as: 
• Which buildings do we improve first? 
Which 1 eads to . . . 
• Which buildings provide the most important functions? 
• How much money is available for these improvements? 
It is likely that most organizational activities, 
acting independently, can only provide reliable data or 
information from their own perspective. To answer the 
previous questions they have to either make broad assumptions 
about the command or invest considerable time developing 
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expertise outside of their functional category. Given 
parochial or conflicting opinions about mission priorities and 
the dynamic budget climate, the decisions made may be 
erroneous or incomplete. The overall plan could be better 
served by expanding the scope of a category to provide a forum 
for solving a problem rather than merely providing data. 
For example, an engineer may propose concentrating 
the command's financial resources into correcting deficiencies 
in the structure most susceptible to a specific natural 
disaster. He may not be fully aware of such specifics as to 
the structure's relative importance to the mission or the long 
term budget forecast for the command. 
b. Grouping Tasks to Form Categories Which Solve 
Problems 
A more useful approach than the homogeneous 
functional category is to structure categories such that their 
outcomes actually render specific proposals to solve problems. 
Tasks are grouped according to their utility in solving a 
particular problem. This suggests that a sub-committee be 
comprised of individuals with different areas of expertise. 
In the last example the category could, instead, be 
described as "development of a proposal to mitigate structural 
deficiencies which are deemed to have the greatest impact upon 
the command's mission." Certainly, the office of the 
command's staff civil  engineer would continue to play a 
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significant role. However, to discriminate between the 
relative importance of various facets of the command's mission 
requires input from and, probably, active representation by 
major departments. The Comptroller Department would provide 
valuable and timely information regarding projected funding 
resources and availability. 
The resulting mitigation proposal should reflect a 
combination of interests whose varied concerns have been 
confronted, weighed and negotiated. It should be noted that 
the sub-committee responsible for this category may elect to 
provide more then one proposal for consideration by the 
steering committee. In any case, the steering committee is 
now in a position to decide upon a proposal(s) whose 
assumptions and merits have been subjected to a broader base 
of expertise as well as competing interests. The category was 
deliberately constructed to provide an outcome which not only 
supplies information, but solves a portion of the overall 
planning problem. 
The determination of specific goals to be achieved 
within each of the phases (Planning, Preparation, Execution 
and Recovery) and the associated tasks required to attain the 
goals, will ultimately govern the selection of specific 
categories which can best serve the overall plan. 
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c. Suggested Actions to Form Categories and 
Assignments within the Sub-committee 
1. Derive tasks which meet the objectives to be achieved by 
the plan. 
2. Group related tasks into functional categories. 
Structure each functional category, such that the outcome 
renders a proposal(s) which helps meet some portion of 
the overall objective. 
3. Formulate separate sub-committees based upon the required 
characteristics of the functional categories. 
d. Suggested Assignments to Form Categories and 
Assignments within the Sub-committee 
1. Planning Officer: Based upon recommendations of this 
study and comments from the Disaster Preparedness 
Officer, submit a list of functional categories tailored 
to the activity to the steering committee for discussion 
and approval. The final list will form the basis of the 
disaster plan. 
5. Define Responsibilities of Sub-committees 
Sub-committees will undertake the actual formulation 
of the natural disaster plan. A common understanding of the 
scope, assumptions, plan direction and format is a necessary 
pre-requisite for continuity of purpose and coordination of 
efforts . 
a. Suggested Actions to Define Responsibilities of 
Sub-committees 
1. Determine the number and composition of sub-committees. 
2. Appoint a chairman of each sub-committee. 
3. Assign a clerk typist or secretary to each sub-committee. 
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b. Suggested Assignments to Define Responsibilities of 
Sub-commattees 
1. Disaster Preparedness Officer: Sub-committee technical 
advisor 
2. Planning  Department  Representative:   Sub-committee 
administrative advisor and coordinator. 
3. Sub-committee members and chairmen: to be determined 
6. Define the Plan's Format 
This step concludes the initiation of the planning 
process. All elements necessary to commence planning have been 
defined and the command is ready to move into actual plan 
formulation. Prior to actual tasking, a plan format should be 
established by the steering committee. Consideration must be 
given to: 
• practical application (developing a specific plan for a 
specific disaster that has a medium to high probability of 
occurring); 
• "user friendliness" of the documentation; 
• ease of updating; 
• elimination of the need to refer to other instructions or 
publications when reading the plan; and 
• the use of simple concepts and checklists to evaluate 
progress. 
The consolidating of various types of disasters into 
a single planning publication is a common format mistake. 
When a specific disaster strikes, such combined publications 
are too complex and unwieldy to be useful.  Responsibilities 
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are not clearly defined, major areas are inadequately 
discussed or not discussed at all, references (if listed) are 
not always available, alternatives are not discussed, etc. 
Restricting each planning document to a specific disaster 
scenario and the selection of a proper format can eliminate or 
reduce these types of problems. To facilitate a functional 
disaster plan, standard military instructional formatting is 
not a requirement, nor is it recommended. A suggested format 
for disaster plans is discussed in Chapter VIII. 
a. Suggested Actions to Define the Plan's Format 
1. Develop a modular format for the natural disaster plan 
based on the phases discussed in this study. Although the 
concepts and development are closely interrelated, each 
module should be capable of being independent of other 
sections. 
2. A recommended format outline (see Chapter VIII) should be 
provided to each sub-committee chairman. 
b. Suggested Assignments to Define the Plan's Format 
1. Planning Department: Develop a generalized plan format 
(see Chapter VIII) and provide an outline model for use 
by sub-committees for input submission. 
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III.  PLANNING PHASE:  PLAN DEVELOPMENT 
A.  PHASE DEFINITIONS 
A comprehensive plan is developed to address the 
identifiable aspects of each phase of the disaster management 
process. The process which attempts to mitigate the hazards 
imposed by a natural disaster consists of at least four major 
phases which may each contain sub-phases or stages. The 
following is a brief discussion of the four phases: 
1. Planning Phase 
This phase involves the planning of programs and 
actions to be developed in the short term and long term before 
the occurrence of an event. It includes measures that will 
reduce overall loss, costs, and mission impairment. 
Accomplished in a non-emergency environment, this phase 
affords management the flexibility to plan for actions which: 
• minimize structural and nonstructural damage; 
• assess risks and vulnerability; 
• set command priorities; 
• establish standard operating procedures; 
• educate members of the organization; and 
• drill members of the organization in immediate disaster 
response actions. 
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The purpose of the Planning Phase is to answer the 
following questions: 
1. What is the risk? 
2. How vulnerable is the command? 
3. What is to be done when the disaster strikes? 
4. Who is responsible for doing it? 
5. When should the action be completed? 
6. What follow-up actions are required? 
2. Preparation Phase 
In this phase the actual requirements identified 
during the plan development stage of the Planning Phase are 
implemented. This is an action oriented phase. It includes 
actual procurement of materials, correction of structural and 
nonstructural hazards, assignment of personnel, the actual 
writing and distribution of a complete planning document and 
the writing and distribution of emergency procedures guides. 
The purpose of this phase is to ensure that issues, policies 
and priorities identified in plan development are carried out. 
3. Execution Phase 
This is a two stage phase. It consists of a period of 
transition followed by a second stage in which full response 
efforts to the disaster are undertaken. During the Execution 
Phase, the command applies those facets of its plan which 
permit direct, efficient and effective action to minimize 
injuries, protect property, and save lives.  The interval of 
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the Execution Phase spans a duration which begins the moment 
that it is known that a disaster is imminent or has occurred. 
The phase continues through an evolution of emergency action 
efforts. There may not be a clear demarkation between the end 
of the Execution Phase and the beginning of the next phase, 
Recovery. Recovery begins when it is clear that the 
preponderance of danger to personnel and to facilities has 
passed. 
a. Execution Phase:  Transition Stage 
Much of the damage and loss attributed to a natural 
disaster, especially an earthquake, occurs in the first 
moments of the event. As buildings collapse, gas and water 
lines rupture, and fires begin, it is critical that a full and 
calculated response effort be undertaken quickly. Any delay 
or an ineffective response can dramatically increase the 
extent of damage and loss. 
Because it plays such a critical role in setting up 
actions which follow, the transition stage is emphasized here 
as a separate component. Transitioning comprises those 
processes and actions which move the command from a routine 
operational posture into  full scale emergency response. 
The catalyst which begins transition action is 
highly dependent upon the availability and recognition of a 
mechanism(s) which triggers either warnings that a disaster is 
imminent or that a disaster has struck.  Locations which are 
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prone to hurricanes or typhoons may have warnings several 
hours or even days in advance. An earthquake, however, may 
give little or no immediate warning concerning its approach or 
level of intensity. Therefore, it is important that the 
transition stage be carefully planned and rehearsed. 
b. Execution Phase:  Emergency Action Stage 
This stage encompasses the procedures and actions 
taken in the first hours and days following the occurrence of 
a disaster. After establishing an organization dedicated 
specifically to emergency response, planning efforts should 
concentrate primarily upon processes which enable useful 
information to flow between decision makers. 
4. Recovery Phase 
This phase includes actions taken after a disaster to 
restore operations to normal levels. Actions should commence 
as soon as possible after a natural disaster. The completion 
of this phase is contingent upon the severity of disaster and 
the availability of resources to correct the damage. In some 
cases, it may be years or even decades before total 
restoration is complete. 
B.  PLANNING PHASE 
The following major functions are included in the Planning 
Phase: 
• Risk Assessment and Hazard Analysis 
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• Establish Command Priorities 
• Vulnerability Assessment 
• Formulate  an Organization Dedicated Specifically  to 
Disaster Response 
• Provide for Logistic Requirements 
• Personnel Considerations 
• Communication Considerations 
• Transportation Considerations 
C.  RISK ASSESSMENT AND HAZARD ANALYSIS 
Regarding natural disasters, an activity must ask itself: 
• What sort(s) of natural disaster(s) is the command most 
likely to be subjected? 
• How often do these natural disasters occur? 
• What is the expected intensity or magnitude of each 
occurrence? 
• If such a disaster strikes, what general characteristics 
are likely to be exhibited? 
To determine the effect of a natural disaster upon a 
command, the risk of a disaster occurring and an analysis of 
the potential outcomes of the disaster must be established. 
1. Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment determines the susceptibility of the 
command to a specific type of natural disaster and its 
expected magnitude. In this process, the organization 
estimates the frequency that disasters occur during a 
specified period of time.   If probabilities for a natural 
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disaster and their expected magnitudes or intensities can be 
established, the command can begin to set a direction to 
modify the effects of the outcome. 
Primarily, geographical location determines the 
command's level of risk. For example, NSC Charleston is prone 
to earthquakes, hurricanes, and flooding. In this case, three 
separate risk assessments should be performed. NSC Oakland is 
subject to earthquakes. NSC Oakland may also be susceptible 
to the risk of flood and tidal action [Ref. 13], 
Risk assessment for a major earthquake is determined 
from seismic risk. Seismic risk is based upon geographical 
location in one of the five uniform building code seismic 
zones. Zone 4 has the highest probability of an earthquake. 
Zone 0 had the lowest probability.  [Ref. 14] 
For example, the Naval Supply Center, Oakland is 
located in Zone 4. The Naval Supply Center, Charleston is 
located in Zone 3. In Zone 4, the highest or worst seismic 
zone, the command must plan for an earthquake of the most 
severe intensity. In Zone 3, the command should plan for an 
earthquake of a moderate level of intensity. 
Earthquake intensity is measured by seismologists 
using the Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) scale. For public 
information, the term "magnitude" is used more frequently than 
"intensity" as an earthquake measure. The most common 
magnitude scale is the Richter scale.  In performing a risk 
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assessment for earthquakes either scale may be used as long as 
the command is consistent in the scale used. 
The probability of an earthquake of a specific 
intensity occurring in the Bay Area is documented in 
publications such as, A Review of Probabilistic Long-term 
Forecasts for Major Earthquakes in the San Francisco Bay 
Region [Ref. 15]. 
2. Hazard Analysis 
A hazard analysis estimates the damage that would be 
caused by a particular disaster, given the command's present 
state of preparation. In this activity, the organization 
tries to estimate the result of a specific disaster given that 
it happens. Hazard analysis must consider both primary and 
secondary effects of each type of natural disaster. 
A hazard analysis can assist the command in 
determining its vulnerability to the various types of natural 
disasters. This will enable management to make conscientious 
decisions concerning direction, policy and priorities for 
planning. 
A comprehensive hazard analysis is usually beyond the 
capabilities of the command to accomplish. It generally 
requires the assistance of trained professionals. Federal 
agencies, local governmental offices, and commercial 
activities exist that can accomplish hazard analyses either at 
no cost or at minimum cost to the command.  For instance, the 
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Naval Engineering Facilities Command (NEFC) conducts hazard 
analysis for Naval shore installations. 
3. Maximizing Planning Efforts 
A mistake common to planning is to focus management 
efforts on the natural disaster which occurs most frequently. 
However, this specific natural disaster may not pose the 
greatest threat in terms of loss of life, mission impairment, 
or facility damage. Management must examine all types of 
disaster risks and gauge their relative effects in order to 
set planning priorities. Two elements should be used to set 
planning priorities between disaster types: 
• Probability of occurrence of the disaster 
• Level of damage, given that the disaster occurs 
While earthquakes represent NSC Oakland's primary 
threat, NSC Charleston must weigh the risk of an earthquake 
against the risk of a hurricane or severe flooding. Planning 
should address each type of disaster separately. However, 
planning priorities should be determined using a combination 
of probability of occurrence and level of damage. 
4. Suggested Actions to Assess Risk and Analyze Hazards 
1. Determine the types of natural disasters to which the 
command is susceptible based on geographic location. 
2. Determine probabilistic frequency and intensity. 
3. Conduct a site-specific hazard analysis for each type of 
possible natural disaster. 
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4. Compare hazard analyses to establish planning priorities 
between disaster types. 
5. Suggested Assignments to Assess Risk and Analyze 
Hazards 
1. Disaster Preparedness Officer: determine command 
susceptibility to natural disasters. Submit requests for 
hazard analysis using Department of Defense activities, 
Federal agencies, or commercial activities. Requests 
should be coordinated through the command's supporting 
public works activity. 
2. Comptroller Department: if hazard analysis is to be 
performed through commercial sources, program necessary 
funding. If hazard analysis is to be performed by other 
Department of Defense (DoD) or other federal activities, 
formulate support agreements and reimbursable job orders. 
3. Regional Contracting Department: if hazard analysis is to 
be performed through commercial sources, prepare 
solicitation documentation and prepare contracts. 
D.  ESTABLISHING COMMAND PRIORITIES 
Establishing command priorities entails a process of 
choosing between alternatives. Selections are based on the 
relative importance of each alternative to the command. 
The question, "What is most important to the command?" has 
resounding implications in each phase of the disaster planning 
and response effort. Its answer implies a sense of direction 
as well as a system which identifies and prioritizes competing 
alternatives. Too often, the answer to this question points 
to some sweeping generalization directed at "mission" or 
"people."  Even when a given priority is announced, there is 
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often a presumption that its description has the same meaning 
to everyone. 
The organization must determine which of its missions is 
most important. By emphasizing and defending this primary 
mission, however, have other missions been disregarded or 
rendered more vulnerable to the effects of a disaster? Should 
missions be defended at the expense of human life? Within the 
context of a disaster, it is important that these issues are 
deliberately confronted and explored before a disaster 
strikes. 
Disaster plans may fail in their execution because they 
are too general in scope and application. A command's 
strategy which does not adequately reflect its goals and 
priorities contributes to vague generalities in the planning 
process. A planning process which is unclear will exhibit 
weaknesses in direction and application which may not surface 
until periods of crisis. 
Without clear direction, a crisis situation can be 
rendered completely unmanageable. During the Emergency Action 
Stage of the Execution Phase an immediate question that arises 
is, "What or who do we save first?" This implies that 
constrained resources preclude an effort to save everything. 
Delays or confusion in answering this question can produce 
tragic consequences. During the Recovery Phase, an activity 
will have to decide which operations to re-establish 
immediately and which can be restored later.  The Planning 
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Phase provides a forum for addressing these issues before a 
disaster strikes. 
Risk assessment provides the probability and expected 
intensity of each type of disaster occurrence. The command is 
now in position to set a planning direction based upon the 
forecasted outcome of the risk assessment. This direction 
will determine the expenditure of large quantities of 
resources. Given a finite level of resources, it is safe to 
conclude that complete immunity from the effects of disasters 
is not a realistic expectation. However, mitigation of the 
effects of a disaster through a focused, planned effort is 
still feasible. 
Given an environment of constrained resources, the command 
will have to decide fundamental issues based upon some 
criteria which reflects the command's sense of relative 
importance. The notion of choosing between alternatives 
implies an active process of discrimination. The rationale 
that the command uses to make its choices should be 
identifiable, clear and consistent. The basis upon which 
these choices rest plays a fundamental role throughout the 
Planning Phase as well as during subsequent phases. 
During the Preparation Phase, within the context of 
constrained resources, the simple question, "What should be 
fixed first?" provokes further inquiry concerning the basis 
for a discriminatory rationale. The rationale may be 
approached from several different perspectives.   Given a 
50 
forecasted threat, the command may choose to defend any one or 
a combination of the following basic issues: 
• The mission(s):  primary and/or secondary 
• Inputs and outputs 
• Customers 
• People 
It should be noted that these basic issues are difficult 
to isolate. They are not mutually exclusive. Certainly, a 
command's mission can be tied to its customers, its inputs and 
outputs, and its personnel. However, each issue represents a 
starting point in discerning the relationships between 
alternatives and their importance to the command. 
Settling upon a basis for differentiating between options, 
begins a process of command introspection. If "mission" is 
selected as a fundamental criteria of a system of priorities, 
some of the questions which are likely to follow are: 
• What is the central mission? 
• Is there more than one mission? 
• Which mission is the most important? 
• By defending one mission, are other missions imperiled? 
None of these questions are easy to answer.  The same 
questions can be asked of any of the other issues, such as 
"customers" or "people," if they are substituted as a basic 
criterion in place of mission. 
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The most significant limitation to using mission 
accomplishment as the primary criterion on which to base a 
system of priorities, is that it does not consider the value 
of the loss of human life. Neither should the command presume 
that the protection of lives is a fundamental issue of 
priority unless it is emphasized. 
The notions of direction and ordered precedence are 
central to a command's philosophy. However, they are grounded 
in the over-riding practical implications of a limited 
resource environment. Yet, the question, "What is most 
important?," must be answered deliberately and in detail to 
continue the planning process. 
1. Suggested Actions to Establish Command Priorities 
1. Define and select criteria for setting planning 
priorities. If more than one criterion is used, a 
precedence must be established. 
2. Determine the level of resources to be dedicated to the 
planning effort. 
3. Determine the intensity of the natural disaster scenario 
which the plan should address ("worst case" scenario or 
most likely scenario). 
2. Suggested Assignments to Establish Command Priorities 
1. Commanding Officer 
E.  VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 
This task poses the question, " How vulnerable or exposed 
is the command, if a disaster strikes?" Based on the risk 
assessment,  hazard analysis and command priorities,  the 
52 
command must determine its vulnerability to the potential 
threat of a natural disaster. The vulnerability assessment 
indicates which elements of the command need to be defended 
against the potential effects of the natural disaster. 
Vulnerability should be determined based on the maximum 
expected intensity of the natural disaster. Unless otherwise 
stated, the concept of maximum expected intensity will be 
referred to as a  "worse case" scenario. 
To determine vulnerability, one approach that the command 
may take is expressed in the following steps: 
• Step 1:  Inventory all structures in the command. 
• Step 2: Determine a formula or method to evaluate the 
relative vulnerability of each structure to the hazard. 
• Step 3: Determine and rank functions that are most 
critical to completion of the command's mission (or other 
criteria selected when establishing the command's 
priority) . 
• Step 4: Develop a formula or method to combine 
assessments of structure vulnerability and criticality to 
the mission (or other criteria selected when establishing 
command priority) to derive a ranking protocol. 
• Step 5: Prepare summary matrix for each natural disaster 
to describe and integrate the structures' ranking in terms 
of mission importance and vulnerability to the disaster. 
1. Step 1:  Inventory All Structures in the Command. 
All physical structures which belong to the command, 
both owned and leased, should be inventoried and categorized. 
The categories should include the type of structure, primary 
use, the geologic materials underlying the site and the age of 
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the structure. It should be noted that structures may or may 
not be considered buildings. Examples of structures that are 
not buildings are: fences; docks; bridges; power distribution 
networks; sewage treatment plants; etc. All types of 
structures need to be inventoried and assessed for 
vulnerability. 
Some common types of structural materials used to 
build structures are: 
• Un-reinforced masonry 
• Tilt up concrete 
• Reinforced concrete 
• Reinforced masonry 
• Steel frame 
• Wood frame 
• Light metal 
Examples of common structure uses are: 
• Warehousing or material stowage 
• Office or administrative space 
• Protection of production equipment or machinery 







The age of the structure can assist in determining the 
applicable building codes in effect at the time of building 
construction, as well as the probable methods of construction, 
and assessment of condition. 
The  type  of  structure,  materials  used  in  its 
construction, the geologic materials underlying the site and 
the age of the building all contribute to the structure's 
performance when subjected to seismic forces.  The following 
statement describes the significance of earthquake forces on 
structures: 
Earthquake forces result from the shaking of the ground on 
which the structure is supported. Although the ground 
vibrates both vertically and horizontally, it is customary 
to neglect the vertical components of the shaking since 
most structures have considerable excess strength in this 
direction due to safety factor requirements. The critical 
earthquake forces are horizontal forces, similar to wind 
except that they are based on the weight of the building 
rather than the 'sail area' to the wind and are generally 
much larger. A major factor in earthquake-resistant 
design is that the forces are so large that they cannot be 
dealt with elastically (like vertical loads) but must rely 
on the ductility (or toughness) of the material and its 
connections to yield and still remain stable. 
[Ref. 16] 
a. Suggested Actions to Inventory Structures 
1. Inventory  and  categorize  by  characteristics,  all 
structures used by command personnel. 
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b. Suggested Assignment to Inventory Structures 
1. Staff Civil Engineer 
2. Step 2:  Determine Formula/ Method to Evaluate the 
Relative Vulnerability of Each Structure to the Disaster 
a. Terms 
(1) Structural Components 
The portions of a structure that bear loads 
and hold it up are called structural components. Structural 
components resist gravity, and natural elements such as wind 
and rain. Examples of structural portions of buildings are: 
columns (posts, pillars); beams (girders, joists); floor or 
roof sheathing; slabs or decking; load-bearing walls (or walls 
designed to hold up the building rather than merely divide up 
space or keep out the elements); and foundations. Most of the 
structure of a typical building is concealed from view by 
nonstructural materials.  [Ref. 14:p. 1] 
(2) Non-structural Components 
The nonstructural portions of a building 
include every part of it and all of its contents with the 
exception of the structure, or in other words, everything 
except the columns, floors, beams, etc. Common nonstructural 
items include ceilings, windows, office equipment, computers, 
inventory stored on shelves, files, air conditioners, 




Using the results of the hazard analysis, evaluate 
each structure to determine the types and levels of damage 
that each is likely to sustain. The evaluation should 
consider the probability of both structural and non-structural 
damage. Because of the complexity of this evaluation, the use 
of architectural-engineering consultants is recommended. In 
most cases, evaluation of the structure can be completed off- 
site by providing blueprints of existing structures. 
Evaluation of a non-structural component should be 
accomplished by an on-site inspection. The following 
publications can assist in determining probable damage to 
structures due to earthquakes in the San Francisco Bay Area: 
On Shaky Ground [Ref. 17], and Reducing The Risks of 
Nonstructural Earthquake Damage: A Practical Guide, Second 
Edition [Ref. 14]. 
Concurrent with the site evaluation, it is 
recommended that the survey be used to determine 
countermeas^es or mitigating actions (to prevent structural 
or nonstructural damage) and to estimate the associated costs 
necessary to upgrade both structural and nonstructural 
components. Countermeasures could include equipment 
anchorage, restraint, building reinforcement or other retrofit 
measures to reduce the building's vulnerability. 
A listing of recommended countermeasures will 
provide valuable information needed in considering efforts to 
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mitigate the potential damage to facilities and reduce 
casualties to personnel. Additionally, an enumeration of the 
estimated costs of installing countermeasures will enable the 
command to conduct a cost/benefit analysis. When the survey 
is complete, a ranking or protocol of building vulnerability 
should be established. 
c. Naval Facilities Engineering Command 
The Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NPEC) 
provides structural and nonstructural vulnerability 
assessments for Navy shore installations. Activities that do 
not possess records of these assessments, or if updated 
assessments are desired, should request them from NFEC. 
d. Suggested  Actions  to  Evaluate  the  Relative 
Vulnerability of Structures 
1. Check whether prior records concerning structural and 
nonstructural vulnerability assessments exist. If not, 
determine the structural and non-structural vulnerability 
for each building. Assistance for NSC Oakland can be 
obtained through the Naval Facilities Engineering Command 
P.O. Box 727, San Bruno, Ca 94066, (415) 877-7340. 
2. Rank buildings based upon their comparative degree of 
vulnerability. t 
e. Suggested Assignment  to Evaluate  the Relative 
Vulnerability of Structures 
1. Staff Civil Engineer 
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3. Step 3:   Determine Functions Most Critical to the 
Command's Mission Over a Specified Period of Time 
This step ranks the relative contribution of each 
functional activity to the command's mission over a specified 
time period. "Mission" is assumed here as the primary element 
upon which command priorities are based. However, other 
criterion, such as customers or personnel, may be selected by 
the command as its fundamental basis for priority ranking. 
The basic functions performed by the command are determined 
from the command's organizational chart. 
The perspective of time is a secondary aspect which 
may be used to assist in discriminating between short term 
contributions to the overall mission. The duration of time 
that a command can sustain itself without the benefit of an 
established organizational component, is a measure of that 
component's time weighted utility. The period considers the 
consequences imposed by a duration of possible non-performance 
or impaired performance of the function due to the effects of 
a natural disaster. 
The notion of time creates a unique perspective for 
distinguishing the relative importance and relationships of 
major command functions. For example, there is little 
argument that the Planning Department is vital to the command 
in the long term. However, if this department is closed for 
two days, the command could still carry out many aspects of 
its primary mission.  If the Planning Department is closed for 
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two weeks, its contribution would be missed, but the overall 
command could sustain itself. The accumulated backlog created 
by the closure would be substantial, but not crippling. If 
Planning is closed for two months, the effect upon the command 
would be significant and long lasting. 
A common time period bench mark must be established to 
make comparisons which weigh the contributions of 
organizational functions. Regarding natural disasters, and 
earthquakes in particular, short term contributions are of 
primary concern. A 30 day time period provides a useful 
perspective for indicating which functions are absolutely 
germane in sustaining the command during and immediately after 
a disaster strikes. Accordingly, functions should be ranked 
with respect to their ability to contribute directly to the 
primary mission(s) during the first 30 days. 
This ranking emphasizes those functions which require 
the most protection from the effects of a natural disaster. 
The first part of this step is to rank each command function. 
When completed, the actual number of locations where the 
function is performed must be determined, and what percent of 
the function is performed at each site. When making this 
determination, the feasibility of temporarily relocating the 
function during the 30 day window must be considered. 
For example, it is extremely difficult to relocate a 
computer center. Conversely, the relocation of an 
administrative function, such as inventory control,  to a 
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portion of the base which is undamaged may prove to be a 
reasonable, temporary alternative during a thirty day period. 
The two functions may have of the same relevant importance to 
the command's mission. However, it is logical to place 
greater emphasis on protecting the structure which houses the 
Data Processing Department because it cannot be easily 
relocated in the 30 day period. 
In step 4, it will be necessary to combine this 
information with the building vulnerability analysis, which 
was performed in step 2. The information will have to be used 
to calculate the total functional contribution of each 
structure. For some structures, this is relatively simple 
since one and only one function is performed within the 
structure. 
For those buildings containing more than one function 
or for a function that is performed in multiple locations, the 
task will be more difficult. To simplify matters, the 
evaluation criteria can be eased by roughly approximating each 
building's percentage contribution to the mission. 
a. Suggested Actions to Determine which Functions are 
Most Critical to the Command's Mission Over a Specified Period 
of Time 
1. Using a 30 day window as an operating period, rank the 
importance of the major functions which are performed by 
the command (in support of the mission or other criterion 
used as a basis). 
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2. Based upon this priority ranking, determine the 
functional value of each building. 
b. Suggested Assignments to Determine which Functions 
Are Most Critical to the Command's Mission Over a Specified 
Period of Time 
1. Commanding Officer and/or Executive Officer: determine 
basis of system of priorities. 
2. Planning Department: determine each building's functional 
value 
3. Steering Committee: review and approve the work performed 
by the Planning Department to ensure that it is in 
consonance with the Commanding Officer's functional 
ranking. 
4. Step 4: Derive a Ranking Protocol which Combines 
Assessments of Building Vulnerability and Critical Importance 
to Mission 
This step consummates the efforts of the prior steps. 
Its purpose is to: 
• provide the command a method for reviewing its physical 
assets; 
• determine the susceptibility of the physical assets to the 
effects of a natural disaster; and to 
• rank the relative contribution of the physical assets to 
the command's mission. 
The final product of this step will enable the command 
to answer the following questions: 
• What is the risk to the command of a specific natural 
disaster occurring? 
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• How vulnerable is the command's mission (or other 
criterion) to the risk? 
• The outcome also lays the groundwork for determining: 
what is to be done to reduce structural and nonstructural 
hazards? 
The accumulated information should be presented in 
spreadsheet format. This data will change as mitigation 
efforts are completed during the Preparation Phase. Data and 
ranking should be updated periodically. For planning 
purposes, Table III provides a suggested format for 





Type of disaster: Earthquake 
Probability of occurrence in the next 20 years: 
Planning Intensity : Magnitude 7.0 or Greater 
30% 






Nistars Medium High 
(continued) 
CONTRIBUTION TO MISSION OVERALL RANKING 
23% * 2 
* Note: This represents a contribution of 23% to the 
command's overall mission (not just to the mission of physical 
distribution). The sum of all buildings under the cognizance 
of the Physical Distribution Department represents a total 
contribution of 76% to the command's mission. 
(continued) 
STRUCTURAL FACTORS 
CONTRIBUTING TO VULNERABILITY 
RANKING 
NONSTRUCTURAL FACTORS 
CONTRIBUTING TO VULNERABILITY 
RANKING 
foundation: landfill, subject 
to liquefaction 
tall shelving not secured by 
earthquake restraints, 
electrical equipment not 
properly braced, etc. 
(continued) 
ESTIMATED DAMAGE ESTIMATED RECOVERY TIME 
Cracked foundation, Nistars 
rail distortion, displaced 
inventory, electrical systems 
disconnected, computer system 
disabled and partially 
destroyed, loss of life 
probable 
Existing Vulnerability 
structural- 90 days 
nonstructural - 120 days 
Upgraded Vulnerability 








a. Suggested Actions to Derive a Ranking Protocol for 
Structures 
1. Rank all structures based on vulnerability to risk and 
importance to the command's mission (or other criterion 
selected in setting command priority). 
2. Consolidate and present data in an easily understandable 
format. 
b. Suggested Assignments to Derive a Ranking Protocol 
for Structures 
1. Planning Department and Staff Civil Engineer 
5. Step 5: Prepare a Summary Matrix that Integrates a 
Structure's Contribution to Mission with Its Vulnerability to 
a Disaster 
When confronted with the possibility of more than one 
disaster, it may be helpful to use a matrix that compares a 
structure's contribution to mission to the level of damage 
that can be sustained under different "worst case" scenarios. 
This will assist decision makers in allocating resources to 
upgrade the most important structures first. Table IV 
summarizes information derived in Step 4: 
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TABLE IV 


























* E = Earthquake, F = Flood 
** Overall  Appraisal  may  be weighted based on  expected 
probability and intensity of each type of disaster. 
As structure upgrades are completed and the 
vulnerability of a structure is reduced, the matrix should be 
revised. 
a. Suggested Actions to Develop Summary Matrix 
1. Using vulnerability assessments for various natural 
disasters and structures' contribution to mission, 
prepare a summary matrix. 
2. Use the summary matrix to assist in allocating resources 
to ensure that mitigation efforts are properly 
prioritized. 
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b. Suggested Assignments to Develop Summary Matrix 
1. Staff Civil Engineer and Planning Officer:   prepare 
summary matrix. 
2. Steering Committee:   Review and approve the summary 
matrix. 
F.  FORMULATE A DISASTER ORGANIZATION 
This planning task answers the question, "Who is going to 
respond to the disaster once it strikes?" The answer must be 
more than a simple confirmation of the command's organization 
chart and established chain of command. A complete disaster 
response organization must be designed which is based on the 
type of disaster and delineates specific responsibility for 
disaster response and recovery efforts. The organizational 
relationships in the disaster organization should facilitate 
the flow of information between primary decision makers. Some 
natural disasters, such as the approach of a hurricane, allow 
management the time to make organizational re-alignments. 
Other disasters do not afford management this opportunity. 
The disaster organization represents the transformation of 
command priorities and resources into specific 
responsibilities for emergency response actions. 
Typically, military organizations are functionally 
organized to accomplish routine assignments and missions. 
Naval Supply Centers are no exception to this. All supply 
centers are organizationally configured to approximate the 
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same functional arrangement. This functional organization is 
well suited when: 
• a stable environment exists; 
• there is a need to foster development of expertise; and 
• the  mission  requires  relatively  little  internal 
coordination. 
During a disaster there are disadvantages to this type of 
standard organization. The routine, and thus the 
organization, is abruptly disrupted. The effects of the event 
appear as random, rapidly changing and disruptive 
manifestations. Therefore, they cannot be dealt with in the 
same way as a predicted routine. Command priorities may 
change significantly. This fosters conflicts between 
competing interests or stake holders. In the confusion, 
responsibilities may change substantially or be unclear. The 
result is a significant delay in a coordinated and effective 
response effort. Established priorities, clearly delineated 
responsibilities, and a dedicated rehearsal effort are three 
important facets which contribute to a reduced disaster 
response time. 
Several findings in the 17 October 1989 Loma Prieta 
Earthquake After Action Report, revealed that many shore 
establishments were not prepared to immediately respond to the 
disaster [Ref. 1]. This may indicate that organizations have 
difficulty in realigning their functional organizations to 
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deal effectively with a significant, and organizationally 
disruptive emergency. As a comparison, the shipboard 
organization and municipal planning organizations are 
discussed to gain insight to various methods of rapid 
organizational transformations. 
1. The Shipboard Example 
Shipboard organizations have a uniquely refined 
organizational transformation process. At the first 
indication of an actual emergency or the development of 
actions that could lead to an emergency, a ship immediately 
proceeds to "general quarters." This action abruptly alters 
the routine, functional organization of a ship into a new 
organization to meet the threat. Pre-established functions 
necessary to cope with a variety of threat scenarios are fully 
staffed with the most qualified individuals. Redundancy is 
built into the transformed structure to cope with degradation 
due to damage or causalities. 
A ship can accomplish this organizational 
transformation is less than five minutes. It can take hours 
or even days to accomplish a similar transformation at a shore 
activity that has not planned for this contingency. 
Once transformed, the ship is divided into several 
different sectors. Each sector is manned by its own repair 
party, led by a repair officer. The members of the repair 
party typically comprise a nucleus of individuals who have 
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received specialized technical training in a wide assortment 
of areas, such as: medicine, electricity, electronics, 
structural hull mechanics, plumbing, etc. The remainder of 
the personnel receive generalized training in shipboard fire 
fighting and flooding as well as cross-training in other 
specialties to provide redundancy. 
Each repair party works from a repair locker which is 
located within a designated sector. The repair locker 
contains repair and medical equipment, diagrams of the ship, 
and communication terminals to enable contact with other 
primary repair and command elements throughout the ship. 
Within each repair party, line and staff relationships 
are clearly defined to provide an immediate means of 
succession, should leaders be taken out of action. Each 
repair party reports to a central authority, Damage Control 
Central (DCC), which coordinates the efforts of all of the 
repair parties in combatting the threat. Damage Control 
Central is manned by the ship's Damage Control Assistant (DCA) 
who heads a team of technical experts and communicators. If 
Damage Control Central, itself, sustains damage or casualties, 
there is a provision to move its location to a predetermined 
site, usually another repair party. Communications resume, 
and the line/staff relationships remain intact. 
The DCA is charged with maintaining a clear picture of 
the sustained damage and the progress in combatting the 
overall threat. He has the authority to direct the efforts of 
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the repair parties to confront specific damage or to move 
repair parties into other sectors to assist another repair 
party. The DCA reports directly to the ship's Captain 
regarding the status of repair. The Captain maintains overall 
accountability for the condition of his ship. He has the 
authority, at any time, to assume control of the repair effort 
from the DCA or to delegate responsibility for repair efforts 
to someone other than the DCA. 
The shipboard organization and environment embodies 
unique characteristics which contribute extensively to its 
ability to ready itself for an emergency. A primary function 
of a naval ship is to respond to situations which are likely 
to place it in harm's way. Additionally, a ship knows that 
its survival is dependent on its own actions. This element, 
alone, provides a considerable motivation for crew members to 
know and understand their roles during an emergency. 
A ship represents an almost entirely self-sustaining 
unit. It is purposely outfitted with resources to withstand 
a certain level of threat. An abundance of real shipboard 
experience and data exists upon which to base resource levels 
and emergency action plans. 
A ship is a closed community. Access to a ship is 
rigidly controlled. Even in port, visitors are recorded and 
closely monitored. In an emergency situation, all personnel 
can be immediately and precisely accounted for and pressed 
into action. The nature of a contained environment limits the 
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nature of external distractions that can impede a response 
effort. A ship rarely has to contend with media 
representatives or VIP visits amid a crisis situation. 
Crew members live within the confines of the ship and 
are subjected to a highly disciplined regimen. A ship's crew 
is governed by the Uniform code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 
which implies that harsh penalties can be imposed upon crew 
members who do not follow direct, legal orders. The chain of 
command is clear and recognizable. Because of this unusual 
degree of control, a crew can be trained and rehearsed until 
the procedures are ingrained. 
Twenty four hours a day, a designated Officer of the 
Deck (at sea) or a Command Duty Officer (in port) presides 
over an organization of watch standers whose primary 
responsibility is to actively search for any indication of a 
threat. If a threat is encountered, a recognized alarm is 
sounded which can be heard in every space throughout the ship. 
The facets which enable the routine, shipboard 
organization to transform itself so rapidly and effectively 
are: 
• primary mission of Navy ships is naval warfare. This 
mission is easily identified with states of emergency and 
self-preservation; 
• a shared sense of urgency promotes training efforts; 
• experience and data exists which are used to provide 
manning and resource requirements dedicated to addressing 
a threat environment; 
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• all personnel are subjected to a disciplined environment 
with clear lines of authority; 
• the commanding officer is ultimately accountable and has 
considerable latitude to make decisions independently and 
quickly; 
• personnel are assigned specifically to watch for and 
identify a threat; 
• an easily recognized warning system that can be heard 
throughout the ship; and 
• a specific event (coming to "general quarters") triggers 
the transition from the routine organization to the 
disaster organization. 
2. The Municipal Example 
Municipal districts are open communities. Access is 
not restricted, thus individuals may move freely in and out of 
communities. Individuals are governed by public laws which 
emphasize the protection of both individual freedoms and 
private property. 
The sum of community resources may be extensive. They 
comprise both publicly owned and privately owned assets. 
However, it is difficult to mobilize these resources quickly 
and in concert when a disaster strikes. At the center of the 
dilemma, is whether the public sector has the right to co-opt 
private assets to combat a public threat. This appears to be 
a problem which is inherent in a governmental system of 
elected representatives who are sworn to protect the rights of 
individual property owners. 
Typically, a body of elected and appointed officials 
preside over public agencies to protect private property and 
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allocate public resources. A system of checks and balances 
purposely limits the power and authority of any single 
individual. This tends to spread authority among a body of 
community leaders and thus, dilute the accountability of any 
one leader. Decision making, then, becomes an involved, time 
consuming and often evolutionary process. It is characterized 
by negotiated compromises which are designed to appease 
competing interest groups. 
The onset of a natural disaster demands a rapid, 
directed response. Municipal communities have recognized the 
need to incorporate a mechanism to ensure such a response. 
The mechanism must facilitate immediate action, as well as 
provide adequate time to ready public response agencies, take 
stock of the overall damage caused by the disaster and arrange 
for additional resources, if necessary. 
A review of several municipal plans reveals a common 
organizational convention for ensuring a rapid transition to 
an emergency organization. By pre-arrangement, when an 
emergency situation is enacted, an emergency operations center 
(EOC) is established to centrally manage a number of response 
groups who are headed by separate incident commanders. An 
incident commander orchestrates all efforts and personnel at 
a specified disaster site. [Ref. 5] Usually the plan has 
determined what public resources and personnel are at the 
immediate disposal of the EOC and incident commanders. Both 
the chief of the EOC and the incident commanders lead staffs 
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of individuals who are experts in specific areas. All 
required skills which are necessary to respond to a natural 
disaster are already identified and explicitly provided to the 
municipal disaster organization. Therefore, little cross- 
training is needed to gain adequate proficiency or provide 
redundancy of expertise. 
In most plans, it is not clear how much authority the 
emergency operations center can exercise. Generally, the 
center is permitted broad powers within the stated provisions 
of a civic plan. In some cases, the EOC chief reports to an 
established civic body or agency which coordinates overall 
response efforts with other local and federal agencies. In 
other instances, the chief of the emergency operations center 
appears to have the authority to negotiate, on his own, to 
obtain additional resources, if required. 
The incident commander's ability to use private 
resources against the wishes or without the explicit consent 
of a private owner is questionable. The threat of personal 
liability, as well as the protection of individual freedoms 
play a substantial role in the decision to avoid using private 
assets. However, the private sector often displays a strong 
willingness to cooperate. 
Echelons above the emergency operations center often 
comprise a confusing array of public agencies who claim to 
have authority over some aspect of the response process. This 
appears to cloud the issue of ultimate accountability for 
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command and control. Most plans are vague regarding whether 
the orders issued by the operations center can be usurped by 
higher authority, such as a mayor, or a federal agency. 
The main thrust of these municipal plans is to enable 
a team(s) of experienced disaster experts to rapidly assemble 
and respond to an afflicted area(s). The plans appear 
feasible as long as the destruction remains relatively 
isolated to specific locations. However, if the scope of the 
disaster and the associated destruction is widespread, the 
incident teams and the emergency operations center can easily 
become overwhelmed. 
The open access to civilian communities poses 
substantial control problems to the EOC and incident 
commanders. Even under conditions in which the damage is 
isolated in pockets, an incident commander can become 
saturated with distractions, information and requirements. 
The presence of media representatives and various VIP's at 
local disaster sites demanding information, proved to be a 
considerable annoyance during the Loma Prieta earthquake. 
Additionally, the incident commanders had to sort through an 
influx of volunteers and individuals bearing critical 
information at the disaster sites. [Ref. 18] The 
incident commander may not be fully aware of all available 
resources, or diminished resources outside of his sphere of 
assignment. The emergency operations center is prone to the 
same types of problems.  Efforts by the EOC chief to obtain 
76 
information or additional resources from his superiors is 
likely to be hampered by a lengthy bureaucratic screening 
process. 
3. Overview of Typical Navy Shore Installations 
Most Naval shore installations can be described as 
hybrids of both the ship and the municipal examples. However, 
there are also fundamental features that cause Naval shore 
facilities to be different enough from both examples to be 
considered unique. 
The physical characteristics of a Navy shore 
installation are very similar to any civilian community. A 
Navy base may have family housing developments, industrial 
centers, a police or security force, fire department, retail 
establishments, churches, recreation facilities, etc. Access 
to a Navy shore installation is only somewhat restricted. It 
is much more open than a Navy ship, but significantly less 
accessible than a civilian community. 
Unlike a ship, most military installations, such as 
supply centers, are not equipped or manned, as a matter of 
deliberate design, to withstand the effects of a physically 
damaging, external assault. Supply centers are staffed to 
maintain continuity of service to its customers throughout 
periods of ebbing and surging requirements. The physical 
plant and manpower remain relatively stable. The occurrence 
of a natural  disaster  disrupts this stability.   Since 
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resources are not dedicated specifically to a natural disaster 
response effort, a unique organization must be formulated 
from within the existing organization to deal with such an 
event. 
Similar to a ship's commander, the shore installation 
commander is held strictly accountable for all actions which 
affect his base. The base commander has substantial latitude, 
in terms of authority, to centrally control the actions of his 
subordinates and the physical resources that are within his 
jurisdiction. 
A Navy shore installation represents a diverse 
community of members who are military and civilian. These two 
categories of personnel have distinctive relationships with 
the base commander. These unique relationships lead to 
differences in the approach and the degree of influence that 
a base commander can exercise over them. 
In devising a separate disaster response organization, 
it is important that individuals who are to assume key roles, 
are also those personnel over whom the base commander has 
substantial authority. A majority of a supply center's 
organizational members are typically civilian, not military. 
Unlike military members, civilians are not subject to the 
UCMJ. Therefore, the base commanders can exert more control 
over the actions of military members who are within his direct 
chain of command than their civilian counterparts. 
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Civilian government employees are bound by contractual 
obligations to fulfill general and specific task descriptions. 
According to Federal Personnel Manual Supplement 910-1, during 
emergency situations, civilian government personnel are also 
compelled to follow legal orders issued by their commanders in 
support of emergency response efforts. However, the penalty 
for not following orders issued under these circumstances is 
possible termination of employment, not fines and/or a prison 
term. 
4. A Proposal of Compromise for NSC Oakland 
In formulating an emergency response organization for 
NSC Oakland, both the municipal example and the ship example 
provide clues to what is important, in terms of feasibility 
and survival. A typical shore installation has certain 
limitations which preclude either example from being used 
exclusively to design a disaster organization. 
The disaster organization must be able to emerge and 
take action quickly. Personnel involved in the initial 
response process must already be trained and have intimate 
knowledge of the geographic location(s) in which they will 
work. Personnel must also be knowledgeable in a wide 
assortment of skills. Individuals in positions of authority 
must have a clear concept of the limits of their control. 
Additionally, they must be empowered with enough authority to 
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enable  the  accomplishment  of  a  wide  range  of  tasks 
independently. 
Lines of authority and succession must remain distinct 
despite the occurrence of casualties to critical positions. 
The organization must be designed to facilitate the flow of 
pertinent information up and down the chain of command. 
Provisions must be made to relieve on-site decision makers of 
distractions such as media representatives, VIP's, and 
inexperienced volunteers. 
Several basic functional skills are needed during 
disaster response efforts to facilitate an accurate evaluation 
of the damage and effect of a rapid, positive reaction effort. 
As a minimum, the following broad categories of basic skills 
must be included as considerations when developing a disaster 
response organization: 
• Rescue and first aid 
• Structural and nonstructural damage assessment and repair 
• Utilities personnel 
• Hazardous material assessment 




There are three basic methods which can be used to 
organize a disaster response: 
1. Organization strictly along functional skill lines. 
2. Organization which groups with a variety of skills to 
focus on a generalized threat scenario. 
3. A combination of both, i.e., certain response groups are 
organized strictly along functional lines and other 
response groups may comprise a variety of functional 
ski 11s. 
a. Organization Strictly Along Functional  Skill  Lines 
This method may appear to be the most feasible 
choice since it takes advantage of the existing command 
relationships and the separation of functional categories 
inherent in the routine organizational structure. This 
implies less disruption to the existing organization when 
disaster training is held. It also permits the use of the 
established chain of command without appreciably altering the 
fundamental command relationships. 
The first requirement for this alternative is to 
assign functions required to cope with the disaster to 
specific codes or offices in the command. Efforts should be 
made to assign disaster functions to those offices whose 
mission closely approximates the functions required during a 
natural disaster scenario. For example, the public affairs 
office will naturally handle the dissemination of public 
information during a disaster. This would include addressing 
concerns of media representatives and visiting dignitaries. 
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The base fire department would handle fires and flooding. 
Public works would be directed to those areas requiring the 
management of utilities. 
Functions required that are typically not provided 
within the routine organization should be assigned to those 
offices whose services are not needed elsewhere during the 
disaster. For example, the personnel property office could be 
tasked with setting up emergency messing and berthing or with 
providing rudimentary first aid. 
After all functions have been assigned, they must 
be organizationally placed under a central authority who will 
coordinate and direct their efforts during the disaster. 
Again, the existing command organization already provides such 
a structure for command and control. Under this method, the 
command center would probably comprise the commanding officer 
and/or the executive officer, the designated disaster 
preparedness officer and various other individuals whose 
authority and expertise are deemed critical to the decision 
making process. If a functional area or even the command 
center sustains casualties, a clear, recognizable line of 
succession must exist to maintain command and control. 
Despite the apparent convenience of this 
organizational method, there are several limitations which 
should be considered. Under this method, the command center 
is forced to centrally manage every aspect of the response 
process.   Each functional area will have to be directed 
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individually to attend certain aspects of the response. Each 
disaster site may require a significantly different type of 
response effort. If the effects of the disaster are 
widespread, the functional response teams, themselves, will 
have to be split between different sites. This allocation 
process will delay the response effort. Additionally, the 
control center is likely to become overwhelmed processing 
information needed to coordinate efforts at a number of 
disaster sites. 
b.    Organization  which Groups a Variety of Skills to 
Combat  a Generalized Threat 
Both the ship example and the public municipal 
example employ a central authority (damage control central and 
emergency operations center, respectively) to coordinate the 
actions of separate response units (repair parties and 
incident teams, respectively) which are directly involved at 
local disaster sites. The central coordinating authority and 
the individual response units are both comprised of 
individuals with various types of expertise. 
A similar solution can be used by the base. The 
base can be divided geographically into sectors. A response 
team would be assigned to each sector. Each response team 
would be drilled intensively to ensure that it has an intimate 
familiarity with its sector's potential vulnerabilities, 
transportation and communication paths, and the locations of 
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all utility and repair facilitates which can be employed in 
the response effort. 
Each response team would be comprised of members 
with assorted areas of expertise to enable the team to work 
independently while gathering information and dealing with the 
damage. Individuals in functional departments, such as public 
works, would be allotted to the various response teams and the 
command center. It is important that members of each team 
conform to a ranking protocol which delineates authority for 
decision making and eases succession of leadership. This will 
enable continuous response action even if the team sustains 
casualties. 
All response teams would report to a command 
center, similar to an EOC or Damage Control Central. The 
command center would be charged with monitoring the actions of 
each team and coordinating their efforts to overcome the 
effects of the overall disaster. 
The main limitation to this method is that it 
requires a great deal of training time. Depending upon the 
number of teams that are needed, there may not be enough 
people in the command having a needed skill to place one or 
more of them on each team. A certain amount of cross-training 
between individuals in a team is needed to provide an overlap 
of skills, to raise the level of proficiency for each required 
skill and to enhance coordination between members. 
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Ships routinely spend significant time training and 
cross-training personnel. For a ship, preparing for an 
emergency response is an integral part of its primary mission. 
However, for a supply center, frequent and lengthy training of 
this nature is disruptive to its primary mission(s) as well as 
costly in terms of lost productivity. As a practical 
consideration, it may not be feasible for a supply center to 
routinely devote large blocks of time to training its people 
in disaster response. 
c. Combined Method 
This method still employs response teams and a 
command center to enable an immediate response posture. Aside 
from those individuals assigned to response teams, there is a 
reserve of personnel which represent different functional 
skills that the command center can draw upon to supplement the 
response teams, where needed. This ready reserve force 
minimizes the number of personnel with rare skills required on 
each response team. 
For example, although the Public Works Department 
would have representatives on each team, the main body of the 
department would be held in reserve to be directed by the 
command center. The public works member(s) on each team would 
provide feedback assessments to the command center regarding 
the extent and nature of the structural and utility damage, as 
well as request specific support.  When the command center 
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sends reserve public works personnel to the site, they would 
be directed by the on-site public works representative who is 
a member of that response team. 
A department, such as the Personal Property 
Department, whose specific functional specialty may not be 
required during disaster response, could be assigned, as 
needed, to jobs requiring specialty skills not normally 
included in the supply center organization. One such skill 
that will be required is advanced first aid. After receiving 
specialty training, a representative from the first aid team 
would be placed on each emergency response team to forward 
assessments to the command center. Specific backup support 
would be provided from the main body which is concurrently 
setting up an aid station. 
Some departments could continue to work relatively 
independently within their functional specialties. The 
Public Affairs Office (PAO) would be involved in gathering, 
screening and releasing pertinent information to the public. 
It would act as a buffer between the command and media 
representatives, VIP's and concerned citizens. There is 
little need for public affairs representatives at a disaster 
site unless media representatives or others are present who 
may distract the emergency workers. There may be a need for 
a PAO member at the command center to pass information to the 
Public Affairs Office and to divert phone calls and questions 
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concerning public information to the appropriate office for 
resolution. 
The combined disaster organization method has the 
advantage of keeping command functional relationships 
relatively intact. As much as possible, members of different 
departments should find themselves working within their 
functional specialties and reporting to personnel who are 
routinely within their chains of command. 
This method also minimizes the disruption to the 
command for disaster training since it does not uproot large 
numbers of people and scatter them among a number of diverse 
tasks and unfamiliar reporting relationships. Most training 
can be scheduled and accomplished separately within a 
department. The need for mass training, involving the entire 
command, is substantially decreased. Also, this type of 
organization decreases the number of essential personnel 
necessary for initial response efforts. The reduced size of 
the response teams simplifies mobilization and facilitates a 
more rapid response. 
5. Suggested Actions Leading to the Formulation of a 
Disaster Organization 
1. Determine the most feasible type of Disaster 
Organization. 
2. Determine composition of response teams, EOC and reserve 
force based on type of disaster organization selected and 
functions to be performed. Functions are described later 
in this thesis. 
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3. Formulate a disaster organizational chart. 
4. Select and assign specific coded positions to fill duties 
required by the disaster response organization. 
6. Suggested Assignments Leading to the Formulation of a 
Disaster Organization 
1. Steering Committee: determine most feasible type of 
disaster organization. 
2. Planning Officer and/or Disaster Preparedness Officer: 
determine composition of disaster response organization. 
3. Planning Officer: formulate an organization chart for 
disaster response. 
4. Sub-committees: select and assign specific coded 
positions to fill duties required by the disaster 
response organization. 
G.  LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS 
To successfully cope with natural disasters, planners must 
thoroughly examine the following: 
• Material and Services Considerations 
• Personnel Considerations 
• Communication Considerations 
• Transportation Considerations 
1. Material and Service Considerations 
The logistic requirements needed to contend with the 
effects of a natural disaster can be complex and diverse. The 
problem is often made more difficult by the failure of a 
command to fully anticipate and prepare for these 
requirements.   Complicating matters further, an increased 
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demand for disaster related supplies and services from public 
and private sectors rapidly depletes their availability from 
normal commercial sources. 
Naval organisations are experienced in identifying 
logistic requirements in support of diverse scenarios and 
contingencies. The ability to provide and sustain logistic 
support is rigorously tested in numerous fleet exercises. 
However, these exercises do not test a supply center's ability 
to respond when it is the focus of a rapidly changing 
environment, such as that caused by a natural disaster. 
The wide availability of supplies at a Naval Supply 
Center may contribute to a false sense of logistic security. 
Supply centers may fail to identify and plan for material 
requirements that are not carried in stock. In a disaster 
situation, supply centers may not consider the difficulties in 
accessing materials which are dispersed widely among several 
warehouses. The loss of basic utilities and computer systems 
complicates these problems. 
Identification and planning for material and service 
requirements prior to a disaster will: 
• enable management to focus on problems unique to the 
disaster; 
• reduce response and recovery time; 
• minimize damage to property; 
• contribute to minimizing the loss of life; and 
• reduce personnel requirements needed to locate materials. 
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2. Steps to Consider Regarding Material Support 
1. Identify material requirements. 
2. Determine the time frame in which material will be 
required (immediately or several days after the event). 
3. Determine the anticipated quantity and costs of material 
required. 
4. Determine whether material is carried or not carried in 
stock. 
5. For material not carried in stock: procure material if 
it is needed immediately prior to or after a disaster 
occurs. Because of budget constraints, material may have 
to be procured over a number of budget cycles. If so, 
procurement priorities must be established. For material 
that may be required days after the disaster, 
skeletonized procurement documents should be prepared 
identifying sources that are at least 50 miles outside of 
the anticipated disaster destruction zone. Pre- 
established Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPA's) will 
expedite ordering and delivery. 
6. For material carried in stock, it is recommended that a 
minimum quantity be issued from stock to the using 
activity with the remaining inventory available for 
replenishment. 
7. Determine pre-positioning locations. For earthquake 
preparedness, it is recommended that materials be pre- 
staged outside in trailers, not adjacent to any 
buildings. The trailers can have the same function as 
repair lockers on ships. Trailers should be supported or 
shored to prevent toppling or collapse during an 
earthquake and anchored if subject to high winds. The 
use of trailers provides logistic mobility and reduces 
the risk of loss due to the structural collapse of a 
permanent storage site(s). 
8. Assign accountability for the pre-positioned material. 
a. Suggested Actions to Address Material Support 
1. Follow recommended material support steps. A list of 
items carried by a large ship repair locker should 
provide a baseline for determining the list. Items 
unique to a shore activity's needs should be added to 
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this list, such as:  electrical generators, portable 
toilets, emergency lighting, and portable pumps. 
b. Suggested Assignments to  Address Material Support 
• 
1. Inventory Control Department: Do steps 1 through 6 above 
with advice from the Disaster Preparedness Officer and 
approval of the steering committee. 
2. Physical Distribution Department:  Do steps 7 and 8. 
3. Steps to Consider Regarding Service Support 
There are four steps to consider regarding service 
support: 
1. Identify which services will be required. 
2. Determine which services can be procured through military 
channels and which require commercial procurement. 
3. Prepare interservice and intraservice support agreements 
(ISSA's) or memorandums of understanding (MOU's) for 
services available through military channels. 
4. Modify existing commercial contracts and/or prepare new 
contracts to include provisions for support during 
emergencies. Be sure to assess the ability of the 
commercial service supplier to survive the disaster and 
be able to continue to function. 
a. Examples of Required Services 
• Heavy lift equipment services to clear debris 
• Search dogs to assist in locating personnel that may be 
trapped in collapsed structures 
• Construction personnel to correct structural and non- 
structural damage 
• Food service workers and food preparation equipment 
• Utility firms to restore utilities or install temporary 
utilities 
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• Medical services 
• Transfer of mission responsibilities 
• Hardware  and  software  computer  experts  to  restore 
information and application systems. 
b. For Services Available Through Military Channels 
Prepare Interservice and Intraservice Support Agreements 
(ISSA's)   or Memorandums of Understanding (MOU's). 
Activities selected for ISSA's and MOU's should be 
outside of the anticipated disaster destruction rone. 
(1) Interservice Support Agreements 
Interservice support is support provided by 
one federal agency to another federal agency. At least one of 
the participating agencies or subdivisions is the Department 
of Defense (DoD) or a DoD Component. [Ref. 19] For 
example, NSC Oakland may want to transfer Personal 
Property/Household Goods responsibilities to a nearby Army or 
Air Force activity for the duration of the disaster and 
recovery. 
(2) Intraservice Support Agreements 
Intraservice support is action on the part 
of one activity to provide support to another activity within 
the same DoD Component or federal agency [Ref. 19]. For 
example, NSC Oakland may anticipate requirements for messing 
and berthing facilities. An ISSA could be established in 
advance through a nearby Naval installation on a reimbursable 
funding basis. 
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(3) Memorandum of Understanding 
A Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) is the 
documentation of mutually agreed statements of facts, 
intentions, procedures, parameters and policies for future 
actions and matters of coordination [Ref. 19]. For example, 
NSC Oakland may establish MOU's with NSC San Diego or NSC 
Puget Sound to facilitate the transfer of various mission 
responsibilities until normal services are restored. 
c. Commercial Service 
Provisions of existing service support contracts 
should be modified to include emergency support requirements. 
Skeletonized documents should be prepared for requirements 
anticipated from the natural disaster not covered under 
current contracts. Indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity 
type contracts or basic ordering agreements can assist in 
speeding up the procurement process. Again, the commercial 
sources used for this purpose should be outside of the area of 
the anticipated disaster destruction zone. 
4. Moving Support Functions 
Depending on the level of damage sustained, it may be 
necessary to move the contracting function (as well as other 
functions) temporarily to another geographic location. One 
solution is to establish a remote support base at another 
defense activity.   Through the use of an ISSA, arrangements 
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can be made for a contracting team to be formed at a remote 
site immediately before or after a natural disaster. 
Naval Supply Center, Oakland, could consider the Naval 
Supply Center, San Diego or Defense Logistics Agency, Tracy, 
California as a potential remote support base. Upon 
activation, the remote support base can place all commercial 
orders and arrange delivery for emergency requirements. 
Skeletonized documents of anticipated requirements should be 
prepared and forwarded to the selected support activity. For 
this concept to operate smoothly, an open line of 
communication must be maintained between activities. 
a. Suggested Actions Regarding Service Support 
1. Determine service requirements. 
2. Prepare ISSA's, MOU's as appropriate. 
3. Investigate feasibility of using remote support base to 
relocate primary service functions, such as contracting, 
messing and berthing, bill paying, etc. 
b. Suggested Assignments Regarding Service Support 
1. All departments: determine anticipated service 
requirements. 
2. Regional Contracting Department: consolidate 
requirements that are anticipated from commercial 
sources. Establish measures necessary to expeditiously 
contract for commercial requirements. 
3. Comptroller: prepare ISSA's and MOU's anticipated for 
disaster related services to be performed by DoD or other 
federal activities. 
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H.  PERSONNEL CONSIDERATIONS 
As discussed in Chapter I, section D,3, an activity must 
be able to sustain itself for a minimum of 24 hours or until 
outside assistance arrives. Self-sufficiency implies that a 
command must be able to respond to the disaster as it evolves 
without the benefit of outside help. A disaster whose damage 
encompasses a wide area is likely to severely tax the 
resources of the surrounding communities. 
For example, a disaster that causes numerous fires 
throughout a wide area will heavily burden the available fire 
fighting services in the surrounding communities. A naval 
activity that does not have its own fire station, and has not 
planned on how to independently fight a fire resulting from a 
natural disaster, can accomplish little to prevent a structure 
from burning to the ground. At best, the activity may be able 
to contain the fire and prevent it from spreading to adjacent 
structures provided that equipment and trained personnel are 
avai1able. 
Planning must take into account available material and 
personnel resources in determining the command's flexibility 
in confronting each situation. Required materials are assumed 
to have been identified and procured in Chapter III, section 
G.  The availability of qualified personnel is limited to: 
• functional skills of individuals in the organization; 
• skills  acquired by  the  work  force from prior  work 
experience; 
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• skills acquired through employee training; 
• skills acquired by individuals in off-duty pursuits; and 
• management's awareness of these skills. 
A distinct advantage navy shore installations have over 
their civilian counterparts is the composition and diversity 
of their work force. Their typical work force is comprised of 
civil service and military employees. 
Characteristically, civilian government employees possess 
a broad range of skills resulting from career related job 
transfers, as well as skills which may have been acquired as 
a result of prior military service. These various traits can 
prove to be invaluable assets during a period of emergency 
response, particularly when outside assistance is not 
immediately forthcoming. 
Military personnel, through shipboard experience, have 
acquired certain skills that can be adapted to a natural 
disaster scenario. In particular, damage control training 
qualifies military personnel to augment the fire fighting 
force. Watch standing skills can be applied to base security. 
The command should identify those skills essential to the 
requirements associated with the various functional categories 
which are listed in the Execution and Recovery Phases. By 
focusing on specific disaster related skill requirements, the 
command can eliminate the need to identify and classify all 
skills available within the command. 
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For example, the function of debris clearance requires 
crane operators, forklift operators, riggers, truck drivers, 
a heavy equipment supervisor, and carpenters for shoring 
operations. Identifying which skills are required will enable 
the command to: 
• match personnel resources with personnel requirements; 
• determine  which  individuals  should  be  selected  as 
essential personnel who will be subject to recall; 
• assist management in determining the best organization to 
cope with a natural disaster; 
• determine available personnel who can be used to augment 
functional areas that become overburdened; and 
• relieve exhausted or injured personnel during the course 
of the Execution Phase. 
After a list of required skills is developed, the next 
step is to match these requirements with specific, primary and 
collateral skills that employees possess. One method of 
accomplishing this is to use a questionnaire. The skill 
survey can be combined with a simple skill level rating 
scheme. The questionnaire could either be a generic list of 
all needed skills or it can be divided into categories based 
on related skills. Skill categories, such as equipment 
operators would include: truck drivers, crane operators, 
forklift operators, etc. 
For simplicity, it is recommended that the questionnaire 
be a generic listing of required skills. This will reduce the 
chance  of  duplicating  efforts.    Additional  personnel 
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information, such as addresses and phone numbers for recall, 
or for notification of relatives in the event of death or 
injury can be solicited at the same time. 
When the survey of all skills is completed, a database and 
skill summary listing can be established. Updates can be 
performed continuously or at specified intervals. Where skill 
shortages exist, it must be determined if they can be 
satisfied by another local military activity or through 
contracted commercial services. If commercial support is 
required, refer to the preceding section concerning material 
and service considerations. 




SKILL SURVEY FOR NATURAL DISASTER PLANNING 
SKILL SURVEY FOR NATURAL DISASTER PLANNING 





RECALL INFORMATION:  (Where can you be reached when you are 
not on duty?) 
ADDRESS 
PHONE 
The following is a list of some specific skills that may 
be required to immediately respond to a natural disaster. 
Please check those skills that you possess and the level of 
proficiency you have. 
PROFICIENCY 
SKILL HIGH     MEDIUM   LOW 
Small engine operation (generator) 
Small engine repair/maintenance 
Forklift Operator (all types) 
Forklift Operator (small) 
Message drafting 
Message typing 
Electrician (low voltage) 
Electrician (high voltage) 
Radio operator (ham, citizen band) 
Radio operator (Navy) 
Fire Fighting 
Welding 
First Aid/CPR/Emergency Rescue 
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Nurse/ Medical Services 
Truck driver (stake) 
Truck driver (semi) 
Crane Operator (heavy) 
Crane operator (light) 
Crane riggers 
Vehicle dispatcher 







Security/ law enforcement 
Food service worker 
Helicopter ground crew (VERTREP) 
Telephone line repairman 
Humanitarian Services 
(counseling,religious lay person, 
CACO, etc) 
Perform physically demanding work 
Requisition Preparation 
(commercial) 
Requisition preparation (military) 
Contracting (small purchase) 
Contracting (> $25,000) 
Financial accounting 
Time card preparation 




Building Inspector (structural) 
Remarks 
For civilian employees please check the appropriate response: 
  I volunteer to serve as a member of the natural disaster 
organization and agree to serve in time of emergency. I 
understand that I may be called upon to serve in areas outside 
the installation boundary if the organization is tasked to do 
so by higher authority. 
  I do not desire to volunteer to be a member of the natural 
disaster organization. I will abide by specific guidance 
regarding the participation of civilian employees during an 
emergency situation as contained in FPM Supplement 910-1. 
In the event that a natural disaster results in my serious 










1. Suggested Actions Regarding Personnel Considerations 
1. Develop an employees' skills questionnaire. A draft 
listing should be submitted for review and comment to 
all departments. The final listing should be reviewed and 
approved by the disaster preparedness officer and the 
steering committee. Skills classifications may, but 
don't necessarily have to coincide with the Federal 
Personnel Manual (FPM) classifications. However, the 
various job skill classifications defined by the Navy, 
Air Force, Army and for civilians can serve as a good 
point of departure for developing this survey. 
2. Administer questionnaire to all employees (military and 
civilian). 
3. Establish, maintain and update employees' skill database. 
2. Suggested   Assignments   Regarding   Personnel 
Considerations 
1. Civilian Personnel Office: for civilian personnel. 
2. Administrative Department: for military personnel. The 
Administrative Department should maintain the complete 
database of all personnel. 
I.  COMMUNICATION CONSIDERATIONS 
In a natural disaster scenario, it is important that clear 
lines of communications be established and sustained at all 
times.  The following excerpt  from the  Commander,  Naval 
Education and Training Center's Disaster Preparedness Plan 
emphasizes the importance of communications during these 
events: 
Communications is the most important element of any 
disaster or crisis response. Without a workable 
communications network, the success of emergency actions 
is questionable. It is essential that responsible 
Commanders identify all available communication assets and 
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plan for their employment during emergencies. When 
providing communications during disasters, every 
precaution must be taken to assure that there is no 
degradation of capability to perform the military mission. 
[Ref. 20] 
Open communication channels facilitate the movement and 
sorting of pertinent information between decision makers. 
There are two separate and distinct communication concerns. 
Internal communications, or communications between individuals 
within the command, are an essential component of the 
command's decision making process. External communications 
involve contact with other military activities outside of the 
base, as well as contact with civilian entities in the 
surrounding communities. External communications are 
necessary to exchange information regarding the availability 
of additional resources, to gain more insight concerning the 
extent and nature of the damage, and to inform superiors about 
mission impacts. 
Assumptions stated earlier regarding the nature and extent 
of expected damage from a major natural disaster will have a 
profound effect on planning for communications. The probable 
effects will require that a second and in some cases a third 
communication network be established in advance. 
1. Internal Communications 
The sensitivity of internal communications to the 
effects of a disaster are often overlooked. Land line 
telephone services, the normal mode of internal communication, 
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are the most vulnerable to serious disruption or total loss. 
Activities that have not anticipated and planned for the loss 
of telephone communication may have to resort to using 
couriers to relay information. 
There are relatively inexpensive alternatives to land 
line telephone services. For example, many commands have 
internal radio frequency systems installed for dispatching 
public works, security, fire department, and personal property 
personnel. These systems can easily be expanded to meet 
communication requirements in times of a natural disaster. 
When using radio frenuency systems during a disaster, 
several problems commonly occur and must be addressed in 
planning: 
• Radio assets are insufficient to meet the needs. 
• Provisions are not made for the command center to monitor 
all available frequencies nor to monitor them 
simultaneously. 
• Base stations in the command center were not connected to 
the electrical generator. 
• Use of a single channel resulted in frequency cluttering. 
• Radios required special batteries that were not available 
or if available were not charged. When the installed 
battery ran low, no provision existed for its replacement. 
• Loss of electrical power at battery recharging stations 
made them inoperable. Sufficient recharging capability was 
not considered at the command center. 
• Radio call signs were not established or they were too 
difficult to remember resulting in increased dialogue and 
further cluttering the network. 
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Forty channel citizen band radios are another internal 
communication alternative. These are considered "line of 
sight" radios. They are prone to signal interference caused 
by physical barriers and/or distance. However, they can be 
reasonably employed outside of buildings and may satisfy the 
needs for communication between response teams who are working 
outside. The units should not be the permanent mount type if 
this alternative is selected. Standard, battery operated, 
portable units or units that can plug into a vehicle cigarette 
lighter are a better selection. Aside from the aspects of 
portability and ease of use, signal strength or range should 
be considered. 
The multiple channel capability of citizen band radios 
will enable response teams to communicate between themselves 
on separate channels without interfering with control center 
communications. The ease of registering citizen band radios 
with the Federal Communication Commission is another 
advantage. 
Primary disadvantages to using citizen band radios are 
the loss of confidentiality and possible interference from 
other sources. California is fortunate that these units are 
not as widely used as they are in other regions. Therefore, 
the likelihood of interference is significantly reduced. 
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2. External Communications 
The inability to communicate with activities outside 
of the command during a disaster effectively isolates the 
command. This lapse in communications bars the command from 
either receiving or giving assistance. It may unnecessarily 
extend the period in which the base must remain self 
sufficient. It also hampers the accurate appraisal of the 
extent of the damage. Finally, external communication 
problems compound the anxiety of personnel on base and off 
base who desire information concerning family and friends. 
When considering planning for external communications, 
the command needs to answer the following questions: 
With whom should the activity establish or reestablish 
communication links? 
What is the purpose of the communication link? 
When will these communication links be required? 
What is the priority for establishment? 
How long must each link be maintained (continuously, 
periodically, or intermittently, as required)? 
What mode of communication is preferred? 
What  are  the  secondary  and  tertiary  modes  of 
communication? 
What modes are within current capabilities? 
What modes are accessible to the command? 
What communication upgrades are required to meet the needs 
identified? 
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In a disaster scenario, it is important not only to 
recognize the need to re-establish external communication 
links that existed prior to the disaster but to recognize the 
anticipated communication channels which will be newly 
established in response to the disaster. Communication links 
may have to be established with: 
• local and non-local naval activities; 
• naval ships and aircraft; 
• local and non-local Department of Defense Activities; 
• local civil authorities (police, fire, local government 
representatives); 
• local radio and television stations; 
• commercial activities; 
• commercial ships and ferries; and 
• Coast Guard ships and helicopters. 
To meet military communication requirements, the Naval 
Supply Center Oakland must comply with Annex K of the Naval 
Base, San Francisco Disaster OPLAN 1-87 for periodic voice and 
message reports and the Navy's OPREP reporting requirements 
[Ref. ll:Annex K] . However, mere compliance with military 
communication regulations may not provide the full scope of 
external communications that are needed. Any deficiencies in 
communications will hamper recovery efforts as well as limit 
opportunities to offer and/or receive assistance. For 
example,  the  inability  to  communicate  with  civilian 
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helicopters may delay evacuation of injured personnel or the 
transfer of supplies to other activities. 
An activity must also have knowledge of communication 
procedures. For example, not knowing that the city of 
Oakland's fire and police dispatchers receive and transmit on 
frequencies 154.355 and 155.37 respectively makes its 
difficult to establish communications with them [Ref. 5:p. 1- 
132] . 
To simplify determining communication requirements and 
procedures it is recommended that a communication matrix be 
developed which addresses the communication questions stated 




ACTIVITY PURPOSE OF 
COMMUNICATION 
WHEN REQUIRED 
U. S. Coast Guard Movement by helo of 
casualties and 
supplies 
as needed or as 
directed 






PRIORITY DURATION PRIMARY MODE 
high (5 of N) as required radio 2181 Khz 
high (1 of N) Immediate voice 
report,  followed 




BACKUP MODES WITHIN CAPABILITIES EXTERNAL SOURCES 
156.8 Mhz (ch-16) 
500 Khz CW 
Yes Navy Ships 
pier side 
radio XXXX Mhz Yes Navy Ships pier 
side 
(cont) 
REQUIRED UPGRADES ESTIMATED COSTS 
none not applicable 
none not applicable 
One requirement that is frequently overlooked is 
communication of personnel matters. This includes notifying 
personnel for recall, contacting military and civilian 
employee's families in case of injury or death, and enabling 
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families to contact the activity. When telephone services are 
inoperable this becomes exceptionally difficult. Notification 
of recall is usually done either automatically based on the 
occurrence of the event or through radio stations that are 
part of the Emergency Broadcasting Network. 
When telephones services are not available, 
communication with families that reside outside the command 
may be limited to personal contact. Assistance in notifying 
the family of an employee's status can be accomplished by non- 
essential personnel when they are released from the work site 
or by an ombudsman communication network. Data gathered in 
the employee skill questionnaire will help in contacting an 
individuals *s family. Individuals who are trained in 
humanitarian services or have close personal relationships 
with a family are best suited to notify the family in the case 
of death or injury to an employee. 
Essential personnel who are required to remain on base 
will be concerned regarding their family's welfare after a 
disaster. The absence of information can increase the 
employee's stress and affect their performance. A strong 
family ombudsman communication network may be the best method 
for gathering and passing this type of information. 
3. Suggested   Actions   to   Fulfill   Communications 
Requirements 
1. Determine and define internal communication requirements. 
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2. Determine and define external communication requirements. 
3. Determine communication deficiencies and associated costs 
to correct the deficiencies. 
4. Establish an ombudsman communication network that can be 
used to relay information between family members. The 
ombudsman network should not be limited to the military 
members of the command, but should also include civilian 
employees. 
4. Suggested  Assignments  to  Fulfill  Communications 
Requirements 
1. Administrative Department: define internal and external 
communications requirements and capabilities and develop 
a communication matrix. 
2. Command Ombudsman: establish a family communications 
network. 
J.  TRANSPORTATION CONSIDERATIONS 
After a disaster, transportation requirements, both 
military and civilian, will be critical. Transportation 
assets are necessary to support movement of personnel, 
transport food, water, and supplies, and assist in debris 
clearance. The predominant form of transportation is motor 
vehicles. This capability is expected to be severely 
disrupted due to roadbed, bridge, and overpass damage. The 
movement of emergency vehicles in areas of high population 
density will further strain road access. 
If the natural disaster occurs during working hours, 
transportation assets including military, commercial, and 
private vehicles will be temporarily isolated within the 
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confines of the base. Vehicles will not be able to move until 
transportation avenues are cleared and certified for use. 
Most vehicular military transportation assets are under 
the control of the local public works department. This 
department may or may not be in the command's operational 
chain of command. For disaster response, an inventory of 
transportation assets should be provided to the area 
coordinator and to the responsible Public Works Department. 
Commercial vehicles awaiting loading or unloading may be 
used as possible assets to enable the movement of materials. 
Prior to releasing these vehicles, the command may want to 
consider the possibility of contracting them for the duration 
of the response and recovery effort. 
Another alternative to supplementing available 
transportation is to use privately owned vehicles, operated by 
their owners, to move personnel and material. For example, 
injured personnel may be transported in private vans, station 
wagons, and trucks to the nearest medical facility or triage 
area. Coordination of these volunteer efforts will be 
required. 
The first transportation priority will be dedicated to 
life-saving functions such as: 
• Ambulance support 
'For NSC Oakland, the area coordinator is Commander, Naval 
Base San Francisco. Transportation assets are controlled by Navy 
Public Works Center, San Francisco Bay. 
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• Fire fighting 
• Search and rescue 
Secondary priorities will include such aspects as: 
• Food transportation 
• Materials transportation 
• Personnel transportation 
In disaster planning, unique transportation requirements 
should be anticipated. For example, the 17 October 1989 
earthquake closed the San Francisco Bay Bridge for over one 
month. To move personnel between Oakland and San Francisco, 
special bus and water ferry services were instituted. Dock 
facilities at a Naval Supply Center are well suited to support 
this type of movement. 
In a major disaster, Naval Supply Centers may be tasked to 
serve as the port of embarkation or debarkation for supplies 
for both the military and civilian community. For 
replenishment by helicopter or by ship, the Naval Supply 
Center will be required to provide necessary support services 
to include, ground crews, line handlers, stevedores, etc. This 
will require advance planning and coordination and should be 
specifically addressed in the final planning document. 
Planning for the refueling of transportation vehicles is 
the final transportation consideration. The loss of 
electrical power will require fueling stations to have backup 
113 
generators or hand pumps to dispense fuel. If an activity 
does not have a refueling capability, siphon pumps may be 
needed to transfer fuel from non-essential to essential 
vehicles until tanker services become available. 
114 
IV.  PREPARATION 
A. PURPOSE 
This phase begins the implementation of functions 
identified under Plan Development. It is the first of three 
action oriented phases.  Preparation entails the: 
• actual procurement of materials; 
• correction of structural and nonstructural hazards; 
• further definition of duties, assignment of personnel; and 
• preparation and distribution of a planning document. 
The specific purpose of the Preparation Phase is to enable 
the command to meet the predicted threat with a calculated 
response. It is here that issues and priorities identified in 
the Planning Phase are carried out. The final execution of 
this phase will result in tangible outputs that will permit 
the command to manage the effects of a natural disaster within 
command guidelines and budget limitations. 
B. FUNCTIONS 
Preparation encompasses functions and associated actions 
to be implemented in a non-emergency environment, within an 
established time frame. Time frames for accomplishment depend 
on the availability of funding, type of appropriation involved 
and command priorities.  Certain preparation actions can be 
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completed after simply procuring the correct material, while 
other actions, such as training will remain a continuous 
function. 
Specific functions to be accomplished within the 
Preparation Phase include: 
Structural hazard mitigation 
Nonstructural hazard mitigation 
Employee training 
Disaster management 
Interservice/Intraservice Support Agreements, Memorandums 
of Understanding and Mu' v?.l Aid Agreements 
Financial analysis 
Emergency team assignment 
Employee recall procedures 
Logistic requirements 
Writing and distribution of Disaster Response Guides 
C.  STRUCTURAL AND NONSTRUCTURAL HAZARD MITIGATION 
Structural and nonstructural hazard mitigation describes 
improvements made to physical structures to reduce the level 
of damage incurred by a natural disaster, as well as enhance 
employee safety. Such improvements are based upon assessments 
of the risk of a natural disaster occurring in the geographic 
area as well as the vulnerability of the structures to a 
natural disaster if one occurs. Mitigation efforts should 
encompass both short term and long term endeavors to upgrade 
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the existing facilities.  Hazard mitigation should be also be 
incorporated into the designs of new structures. 
1. Structural Hazard Mitigation 
Structural hazard mitigation cannot be performed by 
unskilled individuals. The identification of structural 
deficiencies is complex and requires mechanical and civil 
engineers who are specifically trained in this area. 
Countermeasures to correct deficiencies vary in terms of 
methods, capabilities and costs. Qualified engineers will be 
able to outline these alternatives for evaluation by decision 
makers. 
The responsibility of primary organizational decision 
makers is to: 
• pursue identification of potential structural 
weaknesses; 
• set priorities for corrective action; 
• submit funding requirements; and 
• make employees aware of the existence of possible dangers. 
Assessments concerning risk and vulnerability were 
discussed in Chapter III, sections C and E. These 
assessments, coupled with the command's priorities, establish 
a baseline for determining when and how the physical 
facilities can be improved to lessen the potential damaging 
effects of a natural disaster.  In many cases, the scope and 
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nature of the necessary improvements will qualify for Military 
Construction, Navy (MILCON) funding resources. 
2. Nonstructural Hazard Mitigation 
A command, such as NSC Oakland, with a civil 
engineering office, is capable of minimizing many of its 
nonstructural hazards using its own personnel. Nonstructural 
hazard mitigation is simpler and less costly to perform than 
structural hazard mitigation. Also, considerable reference 
material exists that can assist the command in identifying and 
correcting nonstructural hazards. 
A comprehensive checklist of commonly encountered 
nonstructural hazards should be developed by the office of the 
Staff Civil Engineer. Checklists will differ depending on the 
type of disaster expected. If the command desires to prepare 
for more than one type of natural disaster, the checklist 
should reflect information concerning the probable types of 
disasters and possible secondary effects. 
Earthquakes are NSC Oakland's primary natural disaster 
threat. A useful source of information regarding the 
identification and mitigation of nonstructural earthquake 
hazards is the BAREPP 85-10 publication entitled, Reducing The 
Risks Of Nonstructural Earthquake Damage: A Practical Guide 
[Ref. 14]. 
Cognizant departmental managers and an individual from 
the office of the staff civil engineer should conduct a 
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physical survey of each building to identify nonstructural 
hazards. When complete, the engineering staff should review 
the results of the physical survey and determine the 
countermeasures that can be done with in-house resources and 
those which must be done with outside assistance. The review 
should include a list of all associated costs. The results of 
the review should be provided to the steering committee. The 
steering committee will assist the command in setting 
priorities for funding and task accomplishment. As described 
in Chapter III, sections C and E, the basis for setting these 
priorities depends upon the structure's relationship to 
mission accomplishment as determined in the vulnerability 
assessment. 
Repair and hazard mitigation actions can now commence. 
Any work performed by non-engineering personnel such as 
attaching restraining straps and anchoring equipment should be 
inspected and approved by one of the command's engineers. 
3.  Suggested Actions for Structural and Nonstructural 
Hazard Mitigation 
1. Pursue identification of structural and nonstructural 
hazards and mitigation actions. 
2. Set priorities for corrective action. 
3. Submit funding requirements and MILCON projects. 
4. Make employees aware of existing unmitigated hazards. 
5. Unique, practical and cost effective recommendations to 
reduce hazards should be considered for monetary awards 
under the beneficial suggestion program. 
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4. Suggested Assignments for Structural and Nonstructural 
Hazard Mitigation 
1. Staff Civil Engineer: plans, directs, coordinates and 
supervises structural and nonstructural evaluation and 
mitigation 
2. Steering Committee: sets command direction, sets policy 
and determines priority for accomplishment 
D.  EMPLOYEE TRAINING 
Experience may be the best teacher, but it can be costly. 
The 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake caused damage to local naval 
installations that is estimated at $175 million. Casualties 
to military personnel were minimal, and no deaths occurred on 
these mi 1itary installations. However, the earthquake was not 
considered catastrophic in severity. In fact, federal and 
state geologic agency studies predicted a significantly larger 
number of deaths and injuries than actually occurred. [Ref. 
1:S-III-1] Bay Area naval activities were fortunate that the 
costs of the lessons learned were not more expensive in terms 
of property damage and personnel casualties. 
A comprehensive training program is an essential component 
for combatting the effects of a natural disaster. Natural 
disasters occur infrequently. The disaster response 
organization is usually quite different from the routine 
organization. During a disaster, personnel are confronted, 
suddenly, with an alien, changing environment which can 
include every aspect of destruction and human tragedy.  The 
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experience is disorienting. A comprehensive and active 
training program can help prepare individuals for such an 
experience. 
When a major disaster strikes, training contributes 
directly to the ability of individuals to survive. Training 
creates a bank of knowledge and experience to draw upon during 
moments of confusion. A sound training program builds 
confidence, focuses one's actions and sharpens skills. Aside 
from communications, training is probably the most important 
element in dealing successfully with an emergency situation. 
Commands have two training responsibilities. The first is 
to conduct generalized training for all employees. 
Generalized training is broad in scope. Generalized training 
should include the precautions which are taken by individuals 
to protect themselves. The second responsibility of the 
command is to provide specialized training for individuals who 
will perform specific jobs during or after the disaster. 
1. Generalized Training 
Generalized training is a focused extension of the 
command's natural disaster awareness program. It includes 
actions an employee should take both at work and at home. 
Training should include actual classroom lectures and disaster 
simulation. 
Disaster simulation is often not done because adults 
tend to be non-receptive to this training method.   The 
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importance of conducting these drills should not be 
overlooked. A simple earthquake drill such as "duck and 
cover" may seem trivial to adults. However, repetition of 
this drill reinforces desired behavior and counteracts the 
natural instinct to flee. 
Generalized training can be conducted either by the 
fire department, police department, or by the safety office. 
A wealth of information and training aids, such as pamphlets, 
videos and slide shows is readily available from the Red Cross 
and other government organizations. 
2. Specialized Traininc 
Specialized training is necessary to develop and hone 
the skills of individuals who perform essential roles during 
the response and recovery efforts. Additionally, training is 
needed to foster a coordinated effort: 
• among members of each disaster response team, 
• between response teams, and 
• between response teams and the emergency command center. 
Specialized training is normally conducted in two 
phases. The first phase involves group training for 
individuals responsible for a single functional skill. For 
example, all personnel who are responsible for first aid will 
receive training.   Selective training will be provided to 
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these individuals to develop and sharpen their first aid 
skilIs. 
The second phase of specialized training involves 
testing the various response teams with problem scenarios or 
disaster simulations. The scenarios should be as realistic as 
possible in order to evaluate strengths, highlight weaknesses 
and provide feedback for improvement. These disaster drills 
are often staged by higher authority. It is important that 
these training exercises do more than just test the command's 
ability to fulfill the administrative requirements of disaster 
response. 
An example of a good practical exercise is to 
temporarily prohibit members of the disaster organization from 
using the telephone system. This tests the command's ability 
to implement its disaster communication plan. Coupling this 
with a simulated disaster scene would integrate the other 
disaster team functions as well. Advance notification to 
customers and the technical capability to do call forwarding 
would make this type of training feasible. 
3.  Suggested Actions Regarding Employee Training 
1. Commence generalized training of employees. Training 
should be interactive and not just the dissemination of 
information. 
2. Conduct specialized training of functional teams. 
3. Develop disaster drills and damage scenarios. Scenarios 
should include details of the event plus checklists for 
measuring accomplishment of desired actions. Evaluation 
checklists  should  only  be  available  for  use  by 
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individuals evaluating the command's response to the 
situation. 
4. Test the command's ability to respond to various 
scenarios. 
4. Suggested Assignments Regarding Employee Training 
1. Fire Department and Safety Officer: conduct general 
training. 
2. Planning Department: develop scenarios and checklists to 
evaluate training. 
3. Officers-in-Charge of functional categories: conduct 
specialized training. 
4. Department Directors: responsibility for conducting and 
evaluating drills should be alternated between 
departments to enhance command involvement. Certain 
latitude should be given to allow departments to use 
their creativity. 
5. Naval Supply Systems Command: assimilate scenarios from 
all Naval Supply Centers for conducting periodic 
evaluations of selected activities and to test their own 
capability to provide support. 
E.  DISASTER MANAGEMENT 
These actions define management's organizational profile 
and responsibilities for the management of equipment and 
personnel resources associated with response and recovery 
efforts.  Actions include: 
• defining manning for the command center; 
• designating a primary and secondary location for the 
command center; 
• defining command center responsibilities; 
• determining what supplies and equipment will be maintained 
in the command center; 
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• establishing methods for obtaining, sorting and analyzing 
information for decision making; and 
• overview and testing of operational plans and procedures. 
1. Command Center Manning and Location 
The command center is vital for orchestrating disaster 
efforts. Mistakes to avoid when determining command center 
manning and location include: 
not providing for the relief of command center personnel 
during extended operations; 
assigning department directors to the command center, when 
their expertise is needed as on-scene commanders; 
assigning command center responsibilities to the 
Commanding Officer. Commanding Officers should be free to 
personally conduct site visits to observe damage, oversee 
overall relief efforts, and provide moral support. A 
suggested action is to assign the Executive Officer or 
Chief Staff Officer to manage the command center; 
placing command centers in buildings with high structural 
and nonstructural vulnerability. Many activities use the 
command's duty office or quarterdeck as their primary 
command center. It is not uncommon for the duty office to 
be located in the primary administrative building which 
may be one of the oldest and most susceptible structures 
in the command; 
failure to consider the diversity and magnitude of command 
center manning. A typical command center may consist of 
management personnel, message drafters, typists, 
communications personnel, information collectors, damage 
plotters, public information personnel, dispatchers, log 
keepers, photographers, and messengers; 
failure to plan for command center mobility, in the event 
that primary and secondary sites are damaged beyond use. 
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2. Command Center Supplies and Equipment 
Command center supplies and equipment should include: 
• communication radios for internal and external 
communication, and associated support equipment such as 
batteries and charg'rs; 
several phone lines; 
answering machines to provide pre-recorded messages for 
employee information; 
facsimile and copying machines; 
electrical generators; 
vehicles; 
visual aids to includes maps, blueprints, plotting charts; 
administrative supplies and equipment such as pens and 
paper, manual and electric typewriters, forms and 
checklists; 
generator fuel; 
food and water rations; 
emergency supplies such as flashlights, foul weather gear, 
cots and blankets, etc. 
physical security for the command center. 
The mobility of the command center often depends upon 
installed equipment. An activity may consider placing 
portable equipment in specially fabricated boxes for ease of 
transportation in case a temporary command site must be used. 
To increase communication equipment transportability and to 
reduce procurement costs of expensive back-up equipment, an 
alternative is to install secondary antenna array systems and 
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provide  for  the  quick  disconnection  and  connection  of 
communication hardware. 
3. Methods   of   Obtaining,   Sorting   and   Analyzing 
Information for Decision Making 
The management of data is a critical requirement. 
This step addresses the gathering of pertinent information 
regarding the nature and impact of the disaster. Decision 
makers will have to depend exclusively on the quality and 
timeliness of this information during a period of confusion 
and disarray. 
Again, the command's overall priorities should be kept 
in mind as a factor used to rank the kinds of required 
information. The objective is to obtain the most critical 
information first and to ensure that follow-up information in 
these areas continues to flow. One way to accomplish this is 
to develop a standard situation report format which leads 
decision makers to request information for pre-identified 
areas . 
Simple desk guides and checklists should be prepared 
for use by members of the command center. For example, a desk 
guide containing sample messages that must transmitted 
immediately after a natural disaster should be prepared for 
message drafters. 
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4. Overview and Testing of Operational Plans and 
Procedures 
This step represents the culmination of the efforts of 
functional teams. This acts as a dress rehearsal for an 
actual situation.  The purpose of the dress rehearsal is to: 
• test the viability of the disaster response organization; 
• determine the overall continuity of the plan; and 
• correct any deficiencies. 
5. Suggested Actions Regarding Disaster Management 
1. Determine manning, equipment, supplies for the command 
center and a primary and secondary location. 
2. Develop desk guides and checklists for command center 
personnel. 
6. Suggested Assignments Regarding Disaster Management 
1. Administrative Department 
F.  INTERSERVICE/INTRASERVICE SUPPORT AGREEMENTS AND MUTUAL 
AID 
This function establishes formal and informal agreements 
governing interservice and intraservice support that may be 
required by an activity during or after a natural disaster. 
Specific services and functions to be supported were discussed 
in Chapter III, section G,3. Additionally, this function 
will define the provisions and limitations of providing mutual 
aid to civil government. 
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1.  Interservi.ee/Intraservice Support Agreements 
Interservice/Intraservice support includes all actions 
that result in the provision of material, facilities or 
services support between Department of Defense (DoD) 
activities or a federal agency. The normal method used to 
convey support is through memorandums of understanding, 
letters of agreement, or logistic support plans. Typical 
disaster related interservice/intraservice support 
requirements for a Naval Supply Center include: 
• Provisions for an emergency relocation site 
• Provisions for the processing of daily transactions. This 
may range from requisition processing to the assumption of 
all stock point customer support roles. 
• Security support 
• Medical support 
• Fire fighting support 
• messing and berthing support 
• Contracting support 
• Communication support 
• Logistic support 
When considering ISSA's, all nearby Department of 
Defense activities should be considered as candidates for 
either requesting or providing support. For example, NSC 
Oakland should consider the capabilities of activities that 
will probably be unaffected or, at least, less seriously 
effected. Possible resources for such support are: Naval Air 
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Station (NAS) Moffet Field, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), 
Tracy, CA and Fort Ord in Monterey, CA. Conversely, NSC 
Oakland should consider the possible needs of NAS Alameda, 
Naval Station (NAVSTA) Treasure Island and other military 
activities that are likely to sustain damage. It should be 
noted that activities which have not requested an ISSA may 
still require support during or after a natural disaster. 
Navy schools, training activities, and ships should be 
considered as candidates for providing knowledgeable and 
experienced manpower, if required. For example, during the 
recovery phase, additional Navy supply officers and/or members 
in supply enlisted ratings may be needed to augment NSC 
Oakland's staff. The Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, 
California, the Military Transportation School located in 
Oakland, California, and home ported ships are all candidates 
for providing such temporary assistance. This action should 
be considered in the Planning Phase and the supporting 
activities should at least be contacted in the Preparation 
Phase. Wherever possible, a explicit agreements should be 
drawn between the parties to confirm support requirements. 
It is recommended that disaster related ISSAs' be kept 
separate from ISSAs' established for other purposes. When 
finalized, copies of the disaster related ISSA's should be 
included as an appendix to the disaster plan. 
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2. Mutual Aid 
Provisions regarding the use of Naval resources to 
provide civil disaster assistance within the United States is 
outlined by applicable military instructions. The Department 
of Navy may provide assistance to civil authorities only under 
the following circumstances: 
• The President has declared a major disaster to exist or a 
major disaster or emergency is imminent. 
• The Executive Secretary, Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, authorizes DoD response. 
• When a disaster is of such severity that awaiting 
authorization from higher authority would result in 
unnecessary human suffering or severe property damage. 
• When directed by the Principal Planning Agent (PPA) and 
the Regional Planning Agent (RPA). [Ref. 3:Encl. (4), p. 
11] 
Prior to entering any mutual aid agreement, it is 
important that approval be granted by higher authority. This 
will avoid conflicts in resource allocation. For NSC Oakland 
all proposed mutual aid agreements with civil authorities must 
be reviewed and approved by the Commander Naval Base, San 
Francisco, legal staff. 
3. Suggested Actions Regarding ISSA's and Mutual Aid 
1. Determine and/or refine all disaster ISSA's requirements 
and potential sources. 
2. Establish ISSA's, MOU's as required. 
3. Determine Mutual Aid requirements and submit requests to 
the prescribed higher authority for approval. 
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4. Suggested Assignments Regarding ISSA's and Mutual Aid 
1. Comptroller Department: collect and screen information 
from all departments regarding potential ISSA's, MOU' s 
and Mutual Aid requirements.  Prepare documentation. 
G.  FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 
1. Overview 
The allocation of resources plays an instrumental role 
in disaster preparation. In order to reach an adequate level 
of disaster preparation, it is likely that additional command 
resources must be expended. As discussed in Chapter III, 
section D, a system of command priorities is helpful in 
determining the way in which existing resources can be re- 
allocated to fulfill preparation requirements. The mechanism 
for resource allocation is the command's internal budgetary 
process. The implementation of a comprehensive disaster 
preparation plan, especially in the initial phases, requires 
close coordination between planners and the command's 
financial and budgetary experts. 
2. Three Sources of Additional Military Funding 
Depending upon the nature of the requirements, and the 
extent of existing resources, the command may find it 
necessary to submit requests through their major claimant for 
additional funding or for specific funding. Three specific 
Navy funding appropriations can play major roles in meeting 
the command's needs. For general supplies, services, and 
nonstructural  building modifications,  the Operations  and 
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Maintenance, Navy appropriation is the primary funding source. 
Other Procurement, Navy funding may be necessary for the 
procurement of major equipment such as non-standard 
communication hardware. Military Construction, Navy funding 
is the principal funding source for modifying physical 
structures. 
3. Using Funding Opportunities 
Prior to the October, 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, 
little real data existed to accurately assess the viability of 
earthquake preparation measures previously undertaken by local 
Bay Area Naval activities. The Loma Prieta earthquake 
rigorously tested physical structures as well as the existing 
plans and procedures. As a result, a number of limitations 
and weaknesses were noted in existing disaster preparation 
plans. Additionally, the Loma Prieta earthquake has 
substantially raised the level of awareness among government 
and military officials concerning the possible ramifications 
of inadequate preparation if a catastrophic earthquake should 
strike. 
Both the Planning Phase and the Preparation Phase led 
decision makers to identify and appreciate the essential 
requirements which must be considered in preparing for such a 
disaster. This information can be used to justify requests 
for additional funds to be applied to the mitigation of 
natural  disaster  hazards.     Costs  to  correct  damage 
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attributable to this and other recent natural disasters have 
adversely affected the availability of funds for fiscal year 
(FY) 1990. However, the abundance of current data provides an 
opportunity for commands to aggressively pursue funding in 
subsequent years. To capitalize on this funding opportunity, 
timely identification, prioritization and forwarding of 
requirements to various funding sources is essential. 
Given the current, heightened sense of awareness 
concerning the potential damaging effects of natural 
disasters, a command which takes the lead in designing a 
comprehensive disaster prep . .tion program may be considered 
for preferential funding as a pilot program. For example, if 
NSC Oakland can substantiate its requirements in its natural 
disaster preparation program, as well as point out the need 
for similar programs at other supply centers, the Naval Supply 
Systems Command may have grounds to incorporate the generic 
portions of Oakland's program throughout its claimancy. As 
the pilot, NSC Oakland would receive priority funding, and 
increased visibility and attention. 
4. Organizing the Resource Effort 
Specific job orders should be established for tracking 
resources (both labor and material) expended in planning, 
preparing, responding, and recovering from natural disasters. 
The creation of a unique set of job orders will enable the 
command to quickly gather and provide financial information to 
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higher authority. This information will support requests for 
additional funding for disaster preparation, should it become 
available. After a disaster, job orders will help to 
reconstruct the costs associated with response and recovery 
efforts. The accuracy of financial records will provide the 
basis to recoup reimbursable costs and for requesting budget 
augmentations from funding sources. 
5. Suggested Actions for Financial Analysis 
1. After material and service requirements and costs have 
been identified, develop a multi-year funding plan. 
2. Establish a unique set of job orders for tracking 
disaster preparation, response, and recovery 
expenditures. 
6. Suggested Assignment for Financial Analysis 
1. Comptroller Department 
H.  EMERGENCY TEAM ASSIGNMENT 
This function determines the numbers of personnel needed 
to fill specific responsibilities identified in the disaster 
organization and matches personnel assets to requirements. 
The number of personnel to be assigned to specific 
disaster response and recovery functions relates to: 
• the physical size of the activity; 
• the determined level of risk and vulnerability; 
• the type of disaster organization selected; 
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• the skill level of its employees; and 
• command priorities. 
Functional experts, both internal and external to the 
command, can assist management in determining the personnel 
requirements for the functional areas related to the disaster 
organization. For example, based on an expected number of 
rations to be fed, a food service officer can easily compute 
the number of food service workers required for emergency 
messing. 
After personnel requirements are identified, the command 
can match the requirements with available assets. The 
employees' skills survey discussed in Chapter III, section H, 
will assist in this endeavor. Actual assignment of personnel 
to fill essential billets is the responsibility of the 
department heads. Military personnel can be designated to 
fill certain requirements. Civilian personnel may volunteer 
to serve or may be assigned positions in accordance with 
established federal civil service regulations. 
An alternative to assigning individuals by name to the 
disaster organization is to assign codes from the routine 
organization structure to fill disaster organization 
positions. These assignments would remain permanent 
regardless of the individuals who occupy the positions. Note, 
however, this method is not suitable for filling disaster 
positions that require individuals possessing unique skills 
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which  are  not  identified  in  the  routine  operational 
organization. 
The maintenance of a complete personnel roster for the 
disaster organization is important. It is also a continuing 
responsibility due to employee turnover, retirement, and 
military transfers. Periodic updates should be performed on 
a scheduled basis. 
1. Suggested Actions for Emergency Team Assignment 
1. Determine the number of essential personnel required. 
2. Assign personnel (by code or by name) to fill emergency 
manning requirements. 
3. Maintain and update the personnel roster for the disaster 
organization. 
2. Suggested Assignments for Emergency Team Assignment 
1. Subcommittees: determine personnel requirements. 
2  Department Heads: identify individuals (or codes) in the 
command to fill disaster organization positions. 
3. Steering  committee:  review  and  approve  peisonnel 
requirements and selections of individuals (or codes). 
I.  EMPLOYEE RECALL 
The establishment of employee recall procedures assists in 
recalling essential personnel in the event that a natural 
disaster occurs before or after normal working hours. Radio, 
television, telephone, automatic triggering mechanisms, or any 
combination can be used to initiate the recall. For example, 
if  the command desires  to use an automatic  triggering 
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mechanism to initiate a recall, it may state that if an 
earthquake of sufficient intensity to cause extreme shaking of 
residences occurs or visible damage is evident, all essential 
personnel will immediately report to the activity. 
For recall which usei radio and television networks, it is 
suggested that the public affairs officer establish specific 
code words, numbers, or phrases. These will be used to notify 
radio or television stations that an individual with the 
proper authority is contacting them with essential 
information. This will minimize the possibility of prank 
calls and miscommunication. Information on these codes should 
be placed in a secured location that is available to the duty 
office. 
Recall identification cards should be provided tc 
employees to enable them tc travel on restricted highways and 
for gaining access to the base. Recall information should be 
consolidated and copies made available to the duty office. 
1.  Suggested Actions Regarding Employee Recall 
1. Establish internal recall procedures. 
2. Establish procedures with local radio and television 
stations for receiving and transmitting the recall 
di rective. 
3. Advise employees which broadcasting networks they should 
monitor for command information. 
4. Maintain current recall lists. 
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2. Suggested Responsibilities Regarding Employee Recall 
1. Civilian Personnel Office:  establish recall procedures 
and maintain recall lists. 
2. Public Affairs Officer:  liaison with local radio and 
television stations. 
J.  LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS 
This step involves taking actions that satisfy all 
logistic requirements identified in Planning Phase under 
Chapter III, section G.  It includes: 
• identifying all sources and preparing all documentation 
necessary to satisfy commercial material and services 
requirements; 
• procurement and installation of all communication 
equipment and establishing procedures for its operation; 
and 
• procurement and pre-staging of other emergency materials. 
In view of the importance of this function, the complexity 
of logistic requirements, and the diversity and number of 
requirements, a central coordinator should be placed in charge 
to screen the requirements. In this respect, he would be 
responsible for ensuring that departmental logistic inputs 
adequately cover the stated planning requirements. He would 
also be in a position to eliminate unnecessary redundancies. 
It is suggested that this responsibility be assigned to the 
Inventory Control Department. 
To simplify planning for logistic requirements, it is 
recommended  that  material  and  service  categories  be 
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established by the central logistic support coordinator to 
classify and coordinate inputs from other groups involved in 
the disaster planning process. Examples of material 
categories include: administrative support equipment, 
communications equipment, fire fighting equipment, medical 
supplies, food and water supplies, electrical equipment, 
sanitation equipment, and transportation assets. Examples of 
service categories include: utilities, computer support, 
security, food service, fire fighting, transportation 
requirements,, and medical services. 
1. Suggested Action foi Togistic Support 
1. Assign a central logistic support coordinator 
2. Suggested Assignment for Logistic Support 
1. Inventory Control Department 
K.  DISASTER RESPONSE GUIDES 
This step involves the actual writing and distribution of 
a disaster response guide. A disaster response guide is a 
specific written document which: 
• is extremely easy to read; 
• has a thorough index and table of contents; 
• is clearly tabbed by appropriate sections; 
• contains the information needed by a key disaster manager 
or team supervisor to respond to a specifi c disaster; 
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• contains specific information that the user cannot be 
reasonably expected to memorize; and 
• may contain enough information so that a backup user, who 
is less well prepared (trained) than the primary user, 
will be able to successfully perform in the job. 
Additional information regarding a format for the final 
disaster plan is provided in Chapter VIII. 
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V.  EXECUTION PHASE:  TRANSITION TO EMERGENCY ACTION 
A.  PURPOSE 
The Transition Phase moves the command from a routine 
operational posture into full scale emergency response. This 
is management's immediate reaction to a natural disaster in 
order to mitigate the consequences. A term commonly used in 
the business world to describe an organization's calculated 
response to an emergency situation is crisis management 
[Ref. 21]. 
There may be some confusion concerning the use of the term 
"crisis management." To some people, the expression "crisis 
management" represents a criticism of management. This 
implies that management is at fault for placing the 
organization at risk. The term implies that an otherwise 
routine chain of events has., because of mismanagement or 
insufficient planning, evolved into a situation which must be 
dealt with immediately and at greater cost. However, as used 
in this thesis, "crisis management" refers to deliberate 
techniques which an organization employs to preserve itself in 
the face of a crisis. It is a necessary, immediate and 
calculated response to an emergency situation. 
Concerning natural disasters, the crisis situation is not 
the fault of management.  The circumstances have arisen as a 
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result of natural phenomena. As such, the situation demands 
an immediate and determined response. The organization must 
transform itself, mobilize and employ a conscious strategy to 
overcome potentially debilitating events. An organization 
which is adept at this form of crisis management, increases 
its chance of surviving such events. In order to avoid 
confusion concerning the meaning of this expression, the term 
"transitional management" will be used to indicate the 
deliberate and immediate actions of an organization to combat 
an emergency situation. 
B.  PREREQUISITES FOR TRANSITIONAL MANAGEMENT 
For transitional management to succeed, certain essential 
elements are required.  They are: 
• clearly defined disaster policy and objectives; 
• an established disaster organizational structure; 
• delineated disaster team responsibilities; 
• selection of individuals to man disaster teams; 
• team training; 
• team testing; and 
• explicitly defined trigger mechanisms which activate a 
deliberate response to the disaster; 
With  the  exception  of  explicitly  defined  trigger 
mechanisms to activate a deliberate response, the elements 
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listed  above  have  been  addressed  in  the  Planning  and 
Preparation Phases. 
1. Trigger Mechanisms for Response 
A trigger mechanism is a catalyst or alarm device 
which begins the organizational shift from routine operations 
to emergency response. It marks the beginning of plan 
implementation. This mechanism depends upon the availability 
and recognition of signals which either warn that a disaster 
is imminent or that a disaster has struck. Locations that are 
subject to hurricanes or typhoons may receive indications that 
a disaster is imminent, several hours or even days in advance. 
An earthquake, however may provide little or no immediate 
warning concerning its approach or level of intensity. 
There are two kinds of trigger mechanisms. The first 
type is one which is generated by the event itself. As stated 
earlier, there are certain precursors to some natural 
disasters that can be used to forecast that an event is 
imminent. Unfortunately, technology involving earthquakes has 
not provided a consistent, reliable set of measures that can 
be used to precisely pinpoint the probability of occurrence, 
its geographic location and its level of intensity. However, 
once an earthquake has struck, useful measures can be 
developed to rapidly gauge the need for a full or modified 
response effort. 
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The second type of trigger mechanism is one which is 
sounded by the organization as an alert. On a ship, the 
general quarters alarm is heard throughout all spaces and 
intensive training induces a universal recognition of its 
unique sound. The bell is followed by voiced instructions 
which inform the crew concerning the nature of the threat. 
While bells and whistles can be employed with some effect at 
a Naval station, additional measures are necessary to signal 
essential response personnel who may not be on base when the 
disaster strikes. 
Trigger mechanisms must be carefully selected and 
defined. The goal of the selection process is to have the 
trigger mechanism(s) activate the plan only when required. If 
the trigger mechanism(s) is not properly selected and defined, 
the result may be unnecessary or premature plan implementation 
or delayed plan implementation. 
There are repercussions to consider as a result of 
implementing a full response effort unnecessarily or 
prematurely. Resources are used ineffectively and 
inefficiently, normal operations are disrupted, and needless 
costs are incurred. For example, tremors and earthquakes 
occur with regularity on the West Coast. The "chicken little" 
approach of activating the earthquake disaster plan each time 
the ground shakes is unreasonable and ineffective. A sound 
and reliable plan will tend to lose much of its effectiveness 
if its use is perceived as arbitrary.   Occasional plan 
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activation may be a suitable training drill. However, unless 
the event is a pre-planned exercise, unnecessary or premature 
implementation should be avoided. 
Conversely, a hesitation in implementing a needed 
response effort also causes problems. A delay of this sort 
precludes the command from responding in time to contain the 
damage and minimize the number of casualties. Therefore, a 
set of criteria must be developed to rapidly gauge the need 
for a response. 
There is a danger in selecting one and only one 
trigger mechanism. For exsmrle, when an earthquake occurs, 
vital information, such as it^, intensity and epicenter, is not 
immediately available. Therefore, there is little point in 
using the results of this data as primary criteria to trigger 
a response. It is likely that more obvious signs of the 
intensity of the disaster will be evident well before 
seismologists render their precise calculations. 
The solution may be the integration of several 
triggering mechanisms that will enable management to make a 
rapid decision on whether to implement the disaster plan. A 
combination of triggering mechanisms for an earthquake could 
be: 
1. earthquake clustering (a series of small earthquakes that 
indicate the immediate possibility of a major quake) or 
a seismic warning that a major earthquake is imminent; 
2. violent shaking of structures; 
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3. visible damage; 
4. loss of utilities; 
5. personnel casualties; and/or 
6. secondary effects such as fire or flooding. 
After selecting appropriate trigger mechanisms, the 
command should define the way in which the mechanisms are 
applied. The method selected must be adaptable for use, both 
during and after normal working hours. For example, the 
command may decide to automatically implement the plan if 
mechanism 1 is triggered or if mechanisms 2 or 3 are 
triggered. A simple checklist, provided to all members of the 
command is useful in determining if and when the disaster plan 
will be implemented. Awareness of these mechanisms throughout 
the command is vital. Command Duty Officers, Officers of the 
Deck, Petty Officers of the Watch, department heads, and all 
personnel who are designated as essential to the response and 
recovery effort should be equally well versed in recognizing 
those mechanisms which are geared to triggering a response. 
2. Suggested Actions Regarding Triggering Mechanisms 
1. Determine triggering mechanism(s) used to implement the 
disaster plan. 
2. Develop a simple checklist for command distribution 
indicating which conditions trigger disaster plan 
implementation. 
3. Insure trigger mechanisms are incorporated in training 
plans for watch standers and essential personnel. 
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3. Suggested Assignments Regarding Triggering Mechanisms 
1. Steering Committee 
C.  TRANSITIONAL FUNCTIONS 
The following functions will assist the command in 
smoothing the process of transition to emergency response: 
• Preliminary damage reporting 
• Assessment of impact 
• Determining the level of the crisis 
• Commence transition from normal operations to response 
(plan execution) 
It is important to recognize that while each function is 
a part of the Transition Phase, the order of occurrence may 
vary. For a hurricane, determining the level of the crisis 
and transitioning to emergency action could begin days prior 
to the actual disaster. The perceived level of the crisis 
could also change rapidly as the hurricane's track shifts away 
or towards the activity. Of course, the actual consequences 
of the disaster cannot be determined until it occurs. 
However, the probable effects can be gauged in advance and 
actions can be taken based on these probabilities. 
In the case of an earthquake, it is not likely that there 
will be adequate warnings in advance of the event. Therefore, 
the functions should occur chronologically as they are listed 
above. 
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D.  PRELIMINARY DAMAGE REPORTING 
This step provides the basis for determining the 
disaster's actual impact on facilities and personnel. It 
entails the observation, collection and reporting of actual 
data which is pertinent to decision making. As discussed in 
Chapter III, section I, 1, procedures and equipment should be 
in place to ensure that the flow of information to and from 
decision makers is unimpeded. At this stage, the type of data 
which is collected and reported is important. This data will 
be used to assess the actual impact of the disaster on the 
mission as well as provide information needed to satisfy 
initial reporting requirements to superiors external to the 
command. 
One aspect worth noting is that unimpeded communication 
channels substantially increase the volume of information 
which must be processed. Decision makers can rapidly become 
saturated with diverse and seemingly unrelated bits of 
information. It is important to employ an information 
reporting process which aids in the collating of related 
pieces of information. For example, a simple checklist can 
be used to format and tie together pieces of related 




SAMPLE DISASTER REPORT CHECKLIST 
************************************************************* * 
DISASTER REPORT 
Building location  Time of report  
Report number:  initial  follow-up  
Name of individual making the report  
FIRE OR SMOKE VISIBLE: yes       no  
if yes:     major   minor  not sure  
(immediately report all fires) 
EXTERIOR STRUCTURE DAMAGE:(circle) HIGH      MEDIUM      LOW 
a) collapsed exterior walls?     yes      no. 
b) shifted off foundation?      yes. 
c) visible cracks? yes. 
d) electrical wires on ground?   yes. 
e) may building be safely entered? 
maybe   yes. 
PERSONNEL: 





if yes:  life threatening?   yes      no  
if yes:  report immediately! 
b) are any personnel trapped inside the building 
unknown but probable  yes      no  
unknown but unlikely  
c) deaths? 
unknown but probable  yes      no  
unknown but unlikely  
COMMUNICATIONS AND UTILITIES: 
(if structure can be safely entered): 
a) electrical power on? 
b) fire systems operational? 
c) telephone services on? 







INTERNAL DAMAGE: (circle one)  HIGH     MEDIUM LOW 
(if structure can be safely entered) 
a) flooding? yes     no  
b) hazardous material spill?   yes     no  
(if any unusual odors are present leave immediately!) 
************************************************************* 
Specific time frames should be stipulated for reporting 
data. Initial reports should be submitted to the command 
center as soon as possible, at the most, ten minutes after the 
event occurs. Fire reports and reports of life threatening 
injuries must be reported immediately. In any case, reporting 
must not be delayed in order to complete the checklist. The 
inability to generate a report or the failure of the command 
center to receive a report should imply to the command center 
that a problem exists. 
1. Suggested Actions for Preliminary Damage Reporting 
1. Develop checklists for making preliminary damage 
reports. 
2. Develop procedures and time frames for reporting. 
2. Suggested Assignments for Preliminary Damage 
Reporting. 
1. Disaster Preparedness Officer: prepare preliminary 
damage report checklist. 
2. Response Team Leaders: in the event of a natural 
disaster, complete checklists and forward to the command 
center. 
3. Command Center: track and process checklist information. 
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E. ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGE 
The preliminary assessment of overall damage normally 
begins a few minutes after the disaster occurs. If an 
earthquake strikes after normal working hours or on weekends 
or holidays, it is likely that the duty watch section will 
make the initial assessments. During this period, information 
is gathered and evaluated to gain a picture of the extent and 
nature of the damage. The purpose is simply to ascertain what 
has happened and to discern the possible ramifications of what 
has happened. 
F. DETERMINING THE LEVELS 0*" CRISIS 
Crisis levels are used as a means of rapidly communicating 
general information concerning a natural disaster to all 
concerned individuals. The level of crisis is a descriptive 
evaluation and statement of the situation by the commanding 
officer, based on an analysis of information received 
regarding the disaster's impact (probable or actual). Its 
purpose is to provide broad, continuous guidelines for the 
command to follow during a period which is disruptive and 
confusing. 
The framework for determining crisis levels should be 
established in advance and adjusted as events develop. Each 
level  conveys  the  command's  expectations  concerning  an 
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impending disaster or the command's progress through various 
stages of a disaster. 
Crisis levels for hurricanes act as warnings to trigger 
preparedness response actions prior to the event. The 
following list illustrates the progression of levels that are 
used to communicate hurricane information: 
• level 5:  Normal operations. 
• level 4: Warnings indicate that a hurricane with winds 
greater than 64 knots is expected to strike this 
geographic area within 72 hours. 
• level 3: Warnings indicate that a hurricane with winds 
greater than 64 knots is expected to strike this 
geographic area within 48 hours. 
• level 2: Warnings indicate that a hurricane with winds 
greater than 64 knots is expected within 24 hours. 
• level 1: Warnings indicate that a hurricane with winds 
greater than 64 knots is expected within 12 hours. [Ref. 
20:Appendix I to Annex B, p. 1] 
The main purpose of hurricane crisis levels is to take 
full advantage of the advance warning that this sort of 
natural phenomena usually affords. There are two problems 
with this approach. Each natural disaster is unique. Not 
only in its physical characteristics but its impact on the 
command as well. The extent of damage to facilities; injury 
to personnel; effect on the mission; and the time, effort and 
cost to recover are all variables that must be considered when 
setting the level of crisis. A mere descriptive statement of 
a disaster approaching is not sufficient.   For example, a 
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command would take different precautions for a hurricane of 
150 knots than it would for a hurricane of 70 knots. 
Unfortunately, the levels do not distinguish between 
situations on the basis of forecasted storm intensity, but 
only on the basis of forecasted arrival time. 
The second weakness of the hurricane crisis level system 
is that it stops at the moment the disaster strikes. It would 
be advantageous to use a system of crisis levels to describe 
the events and invoke responses as the event progresses from 
warning stages through full recovery. 
A review of municipal and military disaster plans 
indicates that crisis levels are not used at all for 
earthquakes. A sample maximum crisis and minimum crisis level 
that could be applied in this situation is provided for 
clarification. 
• Maximum level: Situation is dire. The command is (is 
expected to be) incapable of performing any part of its 
primary mission, disaster complications are (will most 
likely be) beyond command capabilities. Maximum internal 
and external disaster response is directed to commence 
immediately. Command priority is to concentrate rescue 
operations to structures that have the maximum number of 
personnel missing and the highest probability of survival. 
Fire fighting efforts will be limited to containment. 
Outside medical assistance is urgently needed. 
• Minimum level: mission (will be) slightly impaired, 
disaster complications are (will most likely be) minor, 
continue normal operations. 
By  defining  and  stating  the  level  of  crisis,  the 
commanding officer leaves no doubt on desired direction and 
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policy the command should follow. It is imperative that all 
disaster organizational elements both internal and external to 
the command remain constantly aware of the crisis level in 
effect. 
1. Suggested Actions to Define the Levels of Crisis 
1. Establish levels of crisis for each type of natural 
disaster and incorporate them into the disaster plan. 
2. As soon as possible, before or after a disaster occurs, 
define the level of the crisis. 
2. Suggested Assignments to Define the Levels of Crisis 
1. Disaster Preparedness Officer:   determine levels of 
crisis. 
2. Steering Committee:  review and approve levels of crisis. 
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VI.  EXECUTION PHASE: EMERGENCY ACTION 
A. PURPOSE 
The emergency action portion of the Execution Phase 
represents specific steps taken by the command to confront the 
ramifications of the disaster. Its purpose is to minimize the 
post-disaster effects on property and personnel through the 
physical deployment and coordination of personnel and 
resources. 
This period begins when all emergency functions are fully 
manned and ready to respond. The period lasts until the 
threat of further property damage or endangerment of lives 
ends. Depending on the magnitude of the disaster, and its 
secondary effects, the duration of emergency action could be 
as short as hours or as long as a week or more. During this 
stage, the command center and emergency response teams remain 
fully manned. 
B. FUNCTIONS 
The emergency action phase includes the functions of: 
• Disaster management 
• Detailed damage assessment 
• Establishment of communication channels 
• Transportation of personnel and material 
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Debris clearance 
Search and rescue 
Fire fighting and flood prevention 
Hazardous spill response 
Emergency medical care 
Procurement and logistic support 
Security 
Public information 
Emergency messing and berthing 
Utilities restoration and emergency repairs 
Disaster accounting 
Humanitarian services 
Graves registration activities 
1. Disaster Management 
These actions involve the allocation and management of 
all resources which have been mobilized to counteract the 
effects of the disaster. The actions to be taken are based on 
command priorities which were developed in Chapter III, 
section D. 
Responsibility for disaster management rests with the 
Commanding Officer and is executed by the command center and 
on-site coordinators. Included in this activity is the 
coordination with and reporting to authorities external to the 
command.  Information processing and decision making are the 
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two  primary  components  of  disaster  management,  which 
facilitate the response effort in this stage. 
a. Suggested Actions for Disaster Management 
1. Receive, sort, prioritize and process information. 
2. Allocate resources based on initial damage reports and 
the level of crisis set by the Commanding Officer. 
3. Maintain a chronological record, either recorded or 
written, of all events and management directives. 
4. Prepare all outgoing reports. 
b. Suggested Assignment for Disaster Management 
1.  Command Center 
2. Detailed Damage Assessment 
These actions are an extension of the initial damage 
assessment. Its purpose is to further refine information 
concerning the extent of damage to structures and injury to 
personnel. 
a.  Suggested Actions to  Detail   Damage Assessment 
1. Dispatch damage assessment teams to inspect structures. 
Predetermined command priorities and initial damage 
reports are considered baseline reference points for this 
inspection. However, it is important that these 
reference points are viewed with some flexibility given 
the dynamic circumstances at hand. A standardized, in- 
depth damage assessment checklist should be used. The 
checklist should encompass both structural and 
nonstructural assessments including freight elevators, 
piers and stored material. 
2. Determine the extent of damage to utilities, (water, 
electrical, sewage, telephone, steam) 
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3. Using detailed damage assessment reports evaluate initial 
priority of resource allocation and search and rescue 
operations. 
4. Attempt to define estimated costs of structural and 
nonstructural damage to facilities. 
5. Determine need for outside assistance and notify 
contracting/1ogistic support teams of desired outside 
services. 
b. Suggested Assignments to Detail Damage Assessment 
1. Damage Assessment Teams 
2. Command Center 
3. Establishment of Communication Channels 
These actions activate the disaster communications 
plan. Its purpose is to determine damage to communication 
systems and to re-establish internal and external 
communication links through all available methods, including: 
phone, message, radio, and computer media. Communication 
controls may be needed to prevent the compromise of classified 
information and to keep available channels from becoming 
saturated. 
a. Suggested  Actions to     Establish     Communication 
Channels 
1. Activate internal communication systems and the Regional 
Disaster Response Communications Plan. 
2. Using the communication matrix developed in Planning 
Phase, identify which communication links can be 
established. Periodic attempts should be made to 
establish communications with activities that cannot be 
initially contacted. 
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3. Provide decision makers with a list of open communication 
links. 
b. Suggested Assignment to Establish Communication 
Channels 
1.Command Center 
4. Transportation of Personnel and Material 
This activity determines the level of disruption to 
transportation. Damage to roadbeds, bridges, and overpasses 
must be evaluated and alternate routes selected. 
Transportation management includes all modes of mechanized 
equipment, such as trucks, cars, cranes, and materials 
handling equipment. 
Transportation arteries both internal and external to 
the command and non-standard transportation modes must be 
considered in determining transportation solutions. For 
example, unique transportation modes such as tramp freighters, 
Navy logistic ships, helicopters, ferry boats, tugs and barges 
may be needed to transport critical personnel and materials if 
the Bay bridges are not in operation. On the base, private 
vehicles such as pickup trucks, station wagons, and vans may 
be temporarily converted for use as ambulances or for the 
movement of material. 
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a. Suggested Actions Regarding Transportation of 
Personnel and Material 
1. Assess damage to internal and external transportation 
systems and determine alternate routes. Clearly mark 
routes that have been approved for use. 
2. Mobilize and coordinate deployment of transportation 
assets and operators. 
3. Determine transportation problems that cannot be solved 
internally. Request assistance from higher authority, as 
needed. Surplus transportation assets should be made 
available to other military activities. 
4. Maintain records of transportation assignments for both 
government and non-government assets. 
b. Suggested Assignments Regarding Transportation of 
Personnel and Material 
1. Security Division: assess damage to transportation 
systems. Determine and mark which transportation routes 
are available for use. 
2. Command Center: advise response teams concerning 
approved transportation routes. 
3. Command Center/Transportation Coordinator: mobilize and 
coordinate transportation assets. Determine need for 
outside assistance.  Maintain transportation records. 
5. Debris Clearance 
This function is responsible for the movement of 
debris and wreckage which impedes search and rescue operations 
or the transportation of personnel or material. If heavy lift 
equipment is not available, debris clearance may be limited to 
forklifts, block and tackles, and physical manpower. 
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a. Suggested Actions for Debris Clearance 
1. Determine need for debris clearance. 
2. Provide requirements to transportation coordinators. 
3. Take actions within capabilities and command priorities. 
b. Suggested Assignment for Debris Clearance 
1. Warehousemen in Physical Distribution Department: assign 
to debris clearance. 
6. Search and Rescue 
This activity consists of locating and removing 
trapped and injured personnel from collapsed or damaged 
structures. When working amid unsafe structures, personnel 
engaged in search and rescue may be exposed to substantial 
personal risk. It is recommended that military personnel be 
assigned and trained to perform this function. The legal 
ramifications of using the civilian work force for this 
activity should be investigated. 
Until heavy lift equipment becomes available, 
operations may be restricted to light rescue. Sources of 
heavy lift equipment and search and rescue dog teams is a 
consideration of the Planning Phase. 
a. Suggested Actions for Search and Rescue 
1. Remove trapped and injured personnel from collapsed and 
damaged structures. Probability of survival should be 
used in setting priorities for recovery. 
2. Remove, identify, tag, and forward casualties to a 
designated temporary morgue. 
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3. Notify  the  command center  of  names  and  amplifying 
information on injured personnel and causalities. 
b.    Suggested Assignments   tor  Search and Rescue 
1.  Search and Rescue Team: coordinate with response teams in 
search and rescue. 
7. Fire Fighting and Flood Prevention 
This activity responds to direction from the command 
center regarding reports of fire and flooding. Typically, 
fire and flooding are secondary effects of the natural 
disaster. However, these secondary effects can be more 
devastating than the initial event. Area wide fires, gas 
leaks, and loss of fire main services may compound response 
and require the dedication of substantial resources. 
Ground shifts caused by earthquakes typically rupture 
underground utility pipelines. Contingency planning which 
includes the availability of gas operated pumping and de- 
watering equipment will minimize these effects. Planning for 
fighting fires in structures distantly located from secondary 
water sources (ocean) should be part of disaster training. 
a. Suggested Actions for Fire Fighting and Flood 
Prevention 
1. Deploy fire fighting and flood prevention resources, as 
needed. 
2. Setup equipment for providing a secondary water source 
for fire fighting. 
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b. Suggested Assignment for Fire Fighting and Flood 
Prevention 
1. Command Center: direct fire department to priority areas 
for fire fighting and flood prevention. 
2. Reserve Force: set up and test pumps and other equipment 
to access secondary water supply. 
8. Hazardous Spill Response 
This activity minimizes contamination caused by the 
release of hazardous material. Spills can be caused by 
toppled barrels or containers, gas cylinder leaks or ruptures, 
ruptured fuel lines or any other type of hazardous material or 
hazardous waste spill. Airborne or ground release of 
hazardous materials due to the effects of fire or flooding is 
included in this activity. 
a. Suggested Actions for Hazardous Spill Response 
1. Check sites used for storage of hazardous materials for 
signs of environmental contamination. 
2. Contain hazardous material spills, and decontaminate 
spill areas within the command's capability. 
3. Request outside assistance, as necessary. 
4. Periodically monitor storage sites throughout the 
Execution Phase. 
b. Suggested Assignments for Hazardous Spill Response 
1. Warehousemen in Physical Distribution Department: 
investigate and respond to hazardous material spills. 
Report findings and action taken to the command center. 
2. Command Center: request outside assistance, if 
necessary. Prepare required reports related to hazardous 
spi11s. 
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9. Emergency Medical Care 
This activity involves providing rudimentary first aid 
to injured personnel. Also, arrangements are made for the 
movement of personnel from the disaster site to a designated 
triage area, and then, to a formal medical treatment facility. 
a. Suggested Actions for Emergency Medical Care 
1. Provide first aid to injured personnel at the disaster 
site. 
2. Move injured personnel to a designated triage area for 
further treatment and sorting based on the degree of 
injury. 
3. Move deceased personnel to designated morgue facility. 
4. Arrange for transportation of injured personnel to a 
designated medical treatment facility. For NSC Oakland 
this may be a field hospital, local civilian or military 
hospital, or the hospital ship, USNS MERCY (T-AH 19), if 
available. 
5. Document all injuries, deaths and movement of injured 
personnel. 
6. Provide information to the command center regarding, 
injuries, deaths and movement of personnel. 
b. Suggested Assignments for Emergency Medical Care 
1. Disaster Response Team: provide on-site first aid 
treatment. Provide information to the command center 
concerning deceased and injured personnel. Request 
assistance from the command center if medical care 
resources at the disaster site are overtaxed. Request 
assistance to move injured personnel to triage area. 
2. Emergency Medical Team: set up and operate triage area. 
Prepare injured personnel for further transfer to a 
formal medical facility. Document care provided to 
injured personnel and information on deceased members. 
Periodically inform the command center regarding 
casualties. Request transportation services from the 
command center. 
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3. Command Center: track information concerning the 
identification, status end movement of personnel 
casualties. Arrange transportation for injured and 
deceased from the disaster site and from the triage area. 
Arrange for a formal medical facility to receive injured 
personnel. Notify the humanitarian service team 
concerning injuries and deaths. 
10.    Procurement/Logistic Support 
This activity is responsible for obtaining supplies 
and services from commercial, Federal or Civil sources. 
Included in this function is the accounting, receipt, storage, 
and distribution of essential resources. Supplies and 
services that may be received include: consumable material, 
equipment, manpower, transportation assets, fuel, utilities, 
food, and professional services. 
a. Suggested Actions for Procurement/Logistic Support 
1. Satisfy logistic requirements through the activation of 
ISSA's and through commercial contracting. 
2. Account for all reimbursable expenditures and commercial 
contracts. 
b. Suggested Assignments  for  Procurement/Logistic 
Support 
1. Inventory Control Department: based on information from 
the command center, prepare documentation to satisfy 
logistic requirements. Use standard requisition channels 
to obtain material which is available through government 
sources. Pass requirements for commercial contracting to 
the Regional Contracting Department. 
2. Regional Contracting Department: contract for supplies 
and services not available in the federal sector. 
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11.    Security 
This function is responsible for the control and 
maintenance of physical security. The possible loss of 
electrical power, damage to perimeter security systems, 
general confusion, large inflow of civilian personnel seeking 
shelter, medical care and feeding, and other external 
influences may lead to theft, looting or malicious destruction 
of unprotected buildings. 
The physical size of the base, the proximity and 
character of adjacent residential areas, and the magnitude of 
the disaster influences the level of security required. 
Careful evaluation of security needs will protect both 
property and personnel. The decision must be made whether to 
arm personnel augmenting the normal security force or simply 
provide them radios to request assistance. 
a. Suggested Actions Regarding Security 
1. Determine security needs and deploy forces accordingly. 
2. Enforce base regulations to preserve peace and order and 
control traffic flow. 
3. Periodically advise the command center concerning the 
status of base security. 
b. Suggested Assignment Regarding Security 
1. Base Security: provide base security and determine need 
for supplemental security forces. Periodically report 
security status to the command center. 
2. Command Center: receive reports from security forces. 
Augment security forces, as necessary. 
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12. Public Information 
This activity is responsible for maintaining 
liaisons with public media and Navy news sources. Its purpose 
is to disseminate information regarding personnel recall and 
to prepare items of interest for the local and national media. 
Additionally, this activity acts as a buffer between the base 
and the public media to minimize distractions during disaster 
response and recovery efforts. 
a. Suggested Actions Regarding Public Information 
1. Maintain open lines of communication with news media. 
2. Prepare news releases. 
3. Monitor information media reports and provide pertinent 
emergency information to the command center. 
4. Receive and coordinate requests for visits from VIP's and 
news media. 
b. Suggested Assignment Regarding Public Information 
1. Public Affairs Office 
13. Emergency Messing and Berthing 
This activity provides food and shelter to 
emergency services personnel and to other individuals or 
families as may be directed. 
a.  Suggested Actions Concerning Emergency Messing and 
Berthing 
1. Activate the emergency messing and berthing plan. 
2. Maintain accurate records of personnel using shelters, 
and meals consumed. 
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b. Suggested Assignments Concerning Emergency Messing 
and Berthing 
1. Emergency Messing and Berthing Team 
14. Utilities Restoration and Emergency Repairs 
This activity provides temporary and permanent 
repairs to restore electricity, water, steam, sewer and 
telephone services and other services as may be necessary. 
Included in this function is the operation of electrical 
generators. staging temporary lighting, and placing of 
portable toilets. 
a. Suggested Actions for Utilities Restoration and 
Emergency Repairs 
1. Restore utilities necessary for emergency response 
activities. 
2. Secure utilities and perform needed repairs to correct or 
minimize life threatening situations or limit damage to 
property . 
b. Suggest ed Assignments for Utilities Restoration and 
Emergency Repairs 
1. Office of the Staff Civil Engineer or members of the 
Public Works Department if they are included in the 
disaster organization. 
15. Disaster Accounting 
This function maintains all accounting and 
financial records for services, labor and materials provided 
or used by the command for emergency response and recovery. 
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a. Suggested Actions for Disaster Accounting 
1. Track all expenditures for material, labor, and services 
used for emergency response and recovery. 
2. Prepare summary documents. 
b. Suggested Assignments for Disaster Accounting 
1. Comptroller Department: coordinate with other functional 
areas to collect and summarize expenditures. 
16. Humanitarian Services 
This activity assumes responsibility for services 
normally provided by the family service centers, child care 
centers, and religious organizations, such as the chaplain's 
office. The purpose of this category is to provide counseling 
and care for personnel who may be experiencing loss, 
confusion, or disaster related stress. Included in this 
function is the performance of last rites for personnel, and 
notification of next of kin in the case of death or serious 
injury. 
17. Graves Registration Services 
This activity is responsible for identifying, 
recording and shipping the remains of deceased individuals. 
The "worst case" scenario assumes that a number of deaths will 
occur in the first moments of the natural disaster. A cadre 
of individuals should be trained to deal with the deceased 
remains as they are discovered by emergency response teams. 
The work to be carried out includes: 
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• Removal of bodies from the scene of the disaster. Quick 
and quiet removal of bodies from public view is important 
in maintaining morale. 
• The placement of bodies in a morgue facility. If a morgue 
facility or refrigerated space is not available in the 
area, the bodies should be segregated in a cool dry space 
away from public view. At the first opportunity, 
arrangements should be made to transport the bodies to an 
appropriate facility. 
• Establishment of legal proof of death. This is the 
responsibility of a medical examiner who issues a death 
certificate. In the absence of a medical examiner, 
records should indicate: the likely cause of death, the 
precise area in which the body was found, and the 
individual(s) who discovered the body. 
• Identification of the dead. Efforts should be made to 
identify bodies or at least to obtain all possible 
information. 
• Preparation of an official record of death. An identity 
tag should be attached to the body and all available 
information recorded in a special book. 
• Return of valuable personal effects. Personal effects 
which are found on or near bodies should be taken into 
custody, inventoried and recorded. The next of kin should 
receive the valuable personal effects of the dead. In the 
event that the body is released to other than the next of 
kin, records should be maintained which traces the chain 
of custody by signature for the body and the personal 
effects. 
a. Suggested Actions Concerning Graves Registration 
Servi ces 
1. Remove bodies from the disaster scene and place in a 
morgue or other suitable receiving facility. 
2. Attempt to identify bodies and circumstances surrounding 
the respective deaths. 
3. Establish accountability and chain of custody for each 
body and their respective personal effects. 
4. Arrange for the movement of the deceased to a suitable 
receiving facility as soon as it is feasible. 
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5. Provide information concerning the deceased to the 
humanitarian services team for notification of the next 
of kin. 
b. Suggested    Assignments    Concerning    Graves 
Registration Services 
1. Graves Registration Team: perform all steps above and 
coordinate actions with the Humanitarian Services Team. 
Notify the command center at periodic intervals 
concerning actions taken as well as the identification of 
bodies. Request transportation services as needed from 
the command center. 
2. Humanitarian services Team: verify information provided 
by the Graves Registration Team. Notify the next of kin 
at the earliest opportunity. 
3. Command Center: receive reports from the Graves 
Registration Team. Coordinate efforts between the Graves 
Registration Team and the Humanitarian Services Team. 
Arrange for transportation as needed. 
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VII.  RECOVERY PHASE 
A.  PURPOSE 
The purpose of Recovery Phase is to restore normal 
operations. Recovery begins when the damaging effects of the 
natural disaster have been contained and danger to personnel 
is neutralized. The command's emphasis shifts from emergency 
action to restoration of its facilities and its mission. 
Additional secondary effects, such as earthquake aftershocks, 
can be expected. If the damage sustained by ensuing after- 
shocks is substantial, the command may revert to full 
emergency response. Recovery efforts will continue until long 
term reconstruction is complete. 
Typical conditions which are present in the aftermath of 
a major natural disaster include: 
• a large segment of the work force is either injured, 
deceased, suffering psychological trauma, coping with 
family related problems or physically and emotionally 
exhausted from emergency response; 
• damage and destruction to facilities is widespread; 
• confronting unfamiliar circumstances, employees and 
managers who normally perform in an outstanding manner may 
be ineffective; 
• lack of direction, resources, and necessary skills result 
in wasted manhours; 
• bureaucratic procedures governing funding and procurement 
of supplies and services may delay recovery response; and 
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• work backlogs are considerable. 
The severity and duration of these conditions can be 
reduced by effective management, establishment of clear 
objectives, and by efficient coordination of efforts. 
The passing of the immediate danger may be accompanied by 
a relaxed attitude within the command. Management should be 
aware that a reaction such as this is probable. Planning for 
fresh relief forces specifically geared toward recovery will 
help prevent delays in the recovery response. For NSC 
Oakland, relief forces could come from other Naval activities 
outside the destruction area, as discussed in Chapter IV, 
section F,l. 
B.  Functions 
The Recovery Phase includes the following functions: 
Recovery management 
Recovery financing 
Temporary,  then  permanent  restoration  of  structures, 
utilities, and transportation 
Re-establishment of services/mission(s) 
Inventory accuracy, accountability and condition 
Recovery assistance 
Public information activities and recognition of personnel 
Lessons learned and disaster plan updating 
Long term reconstruction 
174 
1. Recovery Management 
This activity includes: 
• evaluation of the situation and its impact; 
• studying alternatives for corrective action; 
• setting priorities for recovery actions; 
• determining rough estimates of  labor,  services,  and 
funding required in the near term to restore operations; 
• establishing a short-term and a long-term recovery plan; 
and 
• implementing the recovery plans. 
The recovery management team should convene as soon as 
the threat is under control. Each manager should be prepared 
to thoroughly discuss with the recovery management team the 
impacts of the disaster on his/her respective areas and 
possible impact on other areas' functions. 
The purpose of the recovery management team is to set 
clear objectives for restoration, and to avoid premature or 
delayed resumption of functional responsibilities. 
When conditions for recovery begin to stabilize, 
recovery management can be assigned to a smaller staff, that 
maintains and oversees the continuing recovery effort. 
a. Suggested Actions For Recovery  Management 
1. Activate the recovery management team. 
2. Evaluate impact of the disaster on the mission on each 
functional area and on the command's overall mission. 
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3. Estimate resource requirements, costs, and duration of 
recovery efforts. 
4. Review all recovery options and select the best. 
5. Determine recovery/reconstruction priorities. 
6. Determine who should do what and when. 
b. Suggested Assignments for Recovery Management 
1. Recovery Management Team 
2. Recovery Financing and Accounting 
This activity includes tracking expenditures 
associated with recovery, submitting requests for supplemental 
funding, and preparing summary reports. This is a 
continuation of disaster accounting, and should be performed 
by the same individuals. 
a. Suggested Actions for Recovery Financing and 
Accounting 
1. Assign specific job orders for tracking recovery 
expenditures including labor, services and material. 
2. Assess recovery effects in terms of dollars (i.e., lost 
productivity, overtime, replacement of damaged or 
expended material). 
3. Prepare all supplemental budget justifications and budget 
requests. 
b. Suggested Assignments for Recovery Financing and 
Accounting 
1. Comptroller Department 
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3. Temporary, Then Permanent Restoration of Structures, 
Utilities, and Transportation 
This activity restores all essential structures, 
utilities and transportation arteries necessary to resume the 
command's mission. Precedence for restoration is based on 
previously established criteria. Refer to Chapter III 
sections C, D, and E. 
a. Suggested Actions for Temporary, Then Permanent 
Restoration of Utilities, Transportation Capabilities and 
Hazard Abatement 
1. Repair buildings within capabilities and priorities, 
condemn, close and tear down unsafe structures. 
2. Systematically restore utilities to buildings based on 
priorities. 
3. Clear transportation avenues, and certify bridges and 
overpasses for use. 
b. Suggested Assignments for Temporary, Then Permanent 
Restoration of Utilities, Transportation Capabilities and 
Hazard Abatement 
1. Etaff  Civil  Engineer:  coordinate actions to restore 
mission capabilities. 
4. Re-establishment of Services and Mission(s) 
Eventually, the decision must be made to reinstate 
suspended or curtailed services. This decision depends on 
various factors. The importance of the timing of this 
decision is critical. The effects of either premature or 
delayed resumption of services, particularly for a service 
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activity, will directly affect the command's customers. 
Additionally, the command must decide whether services should 
be resumed in increments, or wait until systems are fully 
restored. 
Primary and supporting services should be tested prior 
to resumption to full operation. Customers should be fully 
appraised of backlogs, processing delays or possible problems 
when service is resumed. 
a. Suggested Actions for Re-establishment of Services 
and Mission(s) 
1. Return employees to normal positions as soon as possible. 
2. Test service capabilities. 
3. Assess service capabilities against requirements for 
services. 
4. Decide to re-establish services or take corrective 
actions and return to step 2. 
5. Notify customers of capabilities, limitations, and any 
new or modified procedures. 
b. Suggested Assignments for Re-establishment of 
Services and Mission(s) 
1. Department heads in charge of service functions test 
capabilities in respective areas. Appraise the 
Commanding Officer concerning service capabilities and 
estimated time of recovery. 
2. Customer Services Division: liaison with customers, 
inform them of the command's capabilities and the 
expected dates of resumption of services. 
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5. Inventory Accuracy, Accountability and Condition 
The effects of a major natural disaster on a supply 
center's inventory accuracy could be devastating. 
Considerable inventory may be damaged or destroyed, records 
and documentation may be lost or incomplete, emergency issues 
and receipts may not be recorded. 
This activity's primary purpose is to reestablish the 
command's inventory accuracy and accountability. Aside from 
updating inventory records on computer systems, this activity 
includes restowing displaced inventory in warehouses. 
Depending on the degree of structural and nonstructural 
damage, inventory reconciliation may require either spot 
inventories or complete wall to wall inventories. To reduce 
recovery time, the command may desire to temporarily hire 
additional personnel. Another alternative is to contract 
inventory services through the Integrated Supply Support 
Overhaul Team (ISSOT). 
The command must assess the costs of material totally 
destroyed, change damaged material condition codes, and 
identify material that must be repaired. 
a. Suggested Actions Regarding Inventory Accuracy, 
Accountability and Condition 
1. Follow standard inventory reconciliation procedures to 
account for material that is damaged or destroyed in the 
disaster. 
2. Account for damaged repairables and return them to 
designated overhaul points. 
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3. Adjust the Navy Stock Fund accounts to reflect lost and 
damaged inventory. 
b. Suggested Assignments Regarding Inventory Accuracy, 
Accountability and Condition 
1. Inventory Control Department 
2. Data Processing Department 
3. Physical Distribution Department 
6. Recovery Assistance 
This activity includes actions aimed at assisting 
departments to cope with the effects of the disaster. Work 
sites that received littl- damage can contribute their 
manpower and skills to help restore areas that were heavily 
damaged. This is a team approach to recovery. The objective 
is to distribute the recovery work load such that the time 
required to restore overall operations is minimized. 
Recovery actions involve physically demanding and 
dirty work. Requirements may warrant temporary assignment of 
GS level office workers to warehouses to assist in restowing 
material oi conversely assigning warehouse workers to assist 
in removing debris from offices. Employees and managers 
should be aware that the needs of the activity may require 
these temporary reassignments. 
Disaster assistance should also be expanded to include 
tenant activities and possibly other federal activities in the 
area . 
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a. Suggested Actions Regarding Recovery Assistance 
1. Evaluate each department's immediate personnel 
requirements to recover from the disaster and internally 
reassign personnel as necessary to balance out the 
recovery workload. 
2. If warranted, seek personnel augmentation from activities 
and ships in the local area, or provide assistance to 
requesting activities if it is within the command's 
capability. 
b. Suggested Assignments Regarding Recovery Assistance 
1. Department Heads: determine need for personnel 
reassignments.  Reassign military personnel, as needed. 
2. Civilian Personnel Office: prepare temporary assignment 
documentation for civilian employees. 
7. Public  Information Activities  and Recognition  of 
Personnel 
This activity provides supplemental information to the 
media concerning damage sustained, the progress of recovery 
efforts and estimated time frames for recovery. Human 
interest stories which recognize heroic and exemplary acts by 
employees should be included with information which is 
forwarded to the media. 
Historical and pictorial files related to the natural 
disaster should be maintained. This information is vital to 
future planning efforts and will contribute to "lessons 
learned" reports. 
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a. Suggested Actions Regarding Public Information 
Activities and Recognition of Personnel 
1. Continue communications with local and national 
television and radio stations and newspapers. 
2. Prepare news releases on command activities and any 
heroic or exemplary actions. 
3. Dispatch photographers to record the progress of recovery 
efforts. 
4. Prepare documentation for award recognition. 
b. Suggested Assignment Regarding Public Information 
Activities and Recognition of Personnel 
1. Public Affairs Office 
8. Lessons Learned and Disaster Plan Updating 
Disaster reports and "lessons learned" reports provide 
important information and recommendations for command action. 
"Lessons learned" enable the command to re-evaluate its 
disaster response and recovery plan. They also provide a 
useful data bank for other commands that did not experience 
the actual disaster. Activities facing a similar 
risk/vulnerability profile can then improve their own disaster 
plans using this data bank. This prevents them from having to 
learn these lessons the hard way. 
a. Suggested Actions Regarding Lessons Learned and 
Disaster Plan Updating 
1. Compile information from reports generated by recorders 
in the command center, response teams, and department 
heads to develop "lessons learned".  Include reports from 
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other Naval Activities to gain a perspective on how 
similar problems may have been solved. 
2. In light of recommendations and observations, evaluate 
the command's natural disaster plan and modify it as 
appropriate. 
3. Disseminate "lessons learned" to other commands and to 
higher authority. 
b. Suggested Assignments Regarding Lessons Learned and 
Disaster Plan Updating 
1. Administrative Department: collect data from internal 
and external sources. 
2. Planning Department and Disaster Preparedness Officer: 
review data, publish findings, and update the command's 
natural disaster plan. 
9. Long-term Reconstruction 
This activity plans and coordinates long-term recovery 
efforts. It includes projects to rebuild or replace damaged 
structures, structural and nonstructural mitigation, and 
actions designed to return the activity to full operation. 
Suggested actions and duration of long-term reconstruction is 
dependent upon circumstances related to the nature and extent 
of the disaster. Depending on funding availability and 
mission impact, full recovery may take years. A plan should 
be devised that stipulates a target date for project 
completion. Periodically this plan should be reviewed to 
ensure that recovery action progresses steadily. 
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VIII.  WRITING THE PLAN 
A.  PURPOSE 
As outlined in thu thesis, the primary emphasis in 
planning is the development of a executable disaster and 
recovery plan. However, even the best planning efforts can 
fail, if the concepts, procedures and responsibilities weaken 
by lack of continuing emphasis and loss of corporate memory 
over time. The written word is one avenue for maintaining 
plan continuity and clearly defining plan responsibilities. 
Generally, disaster plans, Loth military and municipal, 
follow a standard administrative format. It is difficult to 
write an executable disaster plan to fit the constraints 
imposed by the format of a military instruction. To obtain a 
better planning product, it is suggested that the plan be 
modular in format and structured around the various functions 
in each of the four phases. 
The ultimate goal is to have a written plan that is 
thorough yet concise; effective and efficient; responsive and 
simple to use. To achieve these objectives and to orient the 
various groups in the same direction, a procedure should be 
developed explaining how the physical writing of the plan 
should proceed.   General guidelines will allow sufficient 
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latitude for groups to be creative in their approach and in 
their solutions. 
B.  METHOD 
The following procedure is suggested for writing the plan: 
Determine if the desired planning, preparation, execution 
and recovery functions, as outlined in this thesis, meet 
the command's needs. Amend selected functions, suggested 
actions and assignments or add new functions as deemed 
necessary. 
Determine the desired natural disaster organizational 
structure. 
Assign a lead code (department or division) to be 
responsible for plan development for each function or 
category. Category refers to those defined in Chapter II, 
section G, 4. The lead code will be responsible for 
organizing the various departments or divisions involved 
in plan development for that function or functional 
category. When possible, the code selected to write a 
segment of the plan or functional category should be the 
same one which is primarily responsible for its execution. 
Task each code which is assigned a function or functional 
category to develop a subcommittee to write the plan. The 
director of this subcommittee should be assigned as a 
member on the phase subcommittee. 
State the expected threat and the assumptions (expected 
outcomes of the disaster). 
Give the Commanding Officer's statement of priorities and 
desired level of planning effort. 
Determine if a plan format is desired (see plan format 
below). 
Determine time frames for accomplishment. A simple Gantt 
chart is suggested. The time allotted for completion 
depends on the planning priorities as stated by the 
Commanding Officer. For routine plan development, a year 
to two years is not an unrealistic period for completion. 
Certain functions or categories, such as the operation of 
the command center, which encompasses coordination of 
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several functions, will continue for most of the allotted 
time. 
• Provide all personnel involved in the planning effort a 
copy of the planning guide (as amended). 
• Use established civilian and military award systems to 
motivate and provide incentives for individuals or groups 
who do outstanding work. It is suggested that incentives 
be stated up front in the form of a contest, with a group 
awards going to the codes that have the best functional 
plans. The best functional plans would be based on both 
the written plan and on demonstrated executability. 
• Periodically, the steering committee should evaluate plan 
progress and make adjustments as necessary. 
• Consolidate all draft functional plans. Return complete 
packages back to responsible codes to revise their 
respective segments to ensure continuity, brevity, 
executability, and thornuqhness. 
• Consolidate all second drafts. Using a developed scenario, 
test the plan. 
• Distribute the working plan. Continue to test and update 
the plan, as necessary. 
C.  PLAN FORMAT 
A specific plan format is not recommended. A general plan 
format, that can be used as a rough guide for the groups who 
are writing the plan, may include the following: 
• Function title 
• Responsible code 
• Threat Statement 
• Assumptions specific to the function 
• Function organization (to include specific codes) 
(Individual names are not recommended because of personnel 
turnover) 
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• Function responsibilities 
• Logistic requirements (manpower, materials, services, 
communications, transportation, etc). Skeletonized 
requisitions and contracts (if applicable) 
• Communication requirements (internal and external) and 
procedures should be outlined in detail 
• Training requirements 
• Funding requirements 
• Procedures and checklists for executing disaster response 
and recovery functions 
• Prior lessons learned 
• Sample reports and messages (if applicable) 
• Potential problems/ alternatives 
• Testing scenarios 
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IX.  CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
A.  CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis stresses the importance of a planning strategy 
to mitigate the damage and loss of lives resulting from a 
natural disaster. Natural disaster planning sets up a 
rational process and establishes decision making criteria. 
As a process, planning for a natural disaster: 
• establishes the command's commitment and sets the 
direction for the organization; 
• forces managers to periodically look ahead at the 
inevitability of a major natural disaster occurring; 
• requires communications within the organization about 
goals, strategic issues and resource allocation in 
preparing for and responding to a natural disaster; 
• stimulates longer-term analyses than would otherwise be 
made, creating a proactive command environment instead of 
reactive environment; 
• creates a psychological backdrop and an information 
framework about a future event which allows managers tc 
make decisions ahead of time; 
• provides a method to protect investments in personnel and 
the physical infrastructure; and 
• deliberately incorporates flexibility in the plan by 
identifying alternative solutions to problems and 
examining methods for adapting to a changing environment. 
For example, it is not possible to predict the exact time, 
intensity or effects caused by an earthquake. Therefore, 
management must purposely plan for various primary and 
secondary effects related to a specific natural disaster. 
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In establishing decision-making criteria, planning for a 
natural disaster enables the command to: 
• make commitments involving the dedication of resources and 
manpower; 
• formalize and focus on a program to deal with an external 
threat to the organization; and 
• help determine the who, what, when, where, why, and how 
these tasks are going to be accomplished as well as 
forecast the associated costs. 
Additionally, this thesis implies that a command must have 
a planned strategy and not an imposed strategy to successfully 
cope with a natural disaster. A planned strategy is a 
deliberate strategy. Precise intentions are formulated and 
articulated by executive management in advance, and reenforced 
by procedures to ensure an orderly and timely implementation. 
Conversely, an imposed strategy is an emergent strategy. 
The external environment dictates patterns of actions, which 
because of the situation and time constraints for action, 
limits organizational choices. In the confusion caused by a 
natural disaster, an imposed strategy may lead to hasty 
management decisions which can fail to identify and resolve 
key problems and issues. At its worst, an imposed strategy 
can misdirect limited resources and delay or impede an 
effective response. 
By using a planned strategy to deal with a natural 
disaster, the command sets priorities, policies, and 
procedures to control an unfamiliar, chaotic environment. 
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B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Disaster planning is a diverse subject covering a broad 
array of functional areas, such as engineering, management, 
logistics, finance, communications, and manpower. The 
difficulty in planning for a disaster is incorporating these 
areas into a cohesive plan that will meet the needs of an 
organization at a reasonable cost in time to mitigate the 
effects of a natural disaster. Because of these impediments 
to planning, many organizations have inadequate plans. In 
these cases, the occurrence of a disaster will cripple the 
organization. 
Available disaster planning literature encompasses general 
guidelines for business or municipalities to follow. Little 
effort has been given to tailoring this information into a 
package suitable for military organizations. This deficiency 
provides many opportunities for further study. 
C. SUGGESTED STUDIES 
1. Measuring Disaster Vulnerability 
Using probabilities of disaster occurrence, develop 
mathematical formulas to measure a military command's 
vulnerability to a natural disaster. Formulas could be 
developed to measure: 
• the expected loss in terms of structures, facilities, and 
personnel; 
• the expected loss in terms of inputs and outputs; 
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• the expected loss in terms of customer support; 
• expected loss in terms of financial impact; and 
• expected loss in terms of mission accomplishment. 
2. Structural and Nonstructural Cost/Benefit Analyses 
Perform cost/benefit analyses of structural and 
nonstructural hazard mitigation actions and determine the best 
methods for using these analyses to justify and request 
funding for completion. 
3. Disaster Communication Plan 
Develop a disaster communications plan and matrix 
(internal and external) for military activities that can be 
used in a variety of scenarios. 
4. Disaster Scenarios 
Develop disaster scenarios that can test both the 
administrative and physical capabilities of military 
organizations to handle a specific disaster of a given 
magnitude. The use of unique methods, such as using a 
computer software program that provides a chronological 
sequence of events to test spontaneity should be investigated. 
5. To Plan or Not to Plan 
Perform a cost/benefit analysis to compare the 
development of a disaster plan against the expected impact of 
not having a plan when a disaster strikes. 
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6. Contracting Out Disaster Planning 
Compare the costs and benefits of a disaster plan 
developed using in-house assets against the costs and benefits 
of contracting out disaster planning to commercial activities. 
Analyze the strengths and weaknesses of both approaches. 
7. Plan Execution 
Determine criteria and checklists for evaluating a 
command's disaster plan for executabi1ity. 
8. Formulate a Disaster Organization for Naval  Supply 
Centers 
Using personnel rerources from the normal command 
organi zat i or, , develop a separate organizational structure 
which can accommodate various types of natural disasters. 
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